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I. Introduction 
Genetic testing is advancing at an unprecedented pace.1 Until 
recently, the testing techniques available in the prenatal context 
were invasive and risky.2 The introduction of non-invasive 
prenatal testing (NIPT) in 2011 has dramatically reduced the 
overall incidence of standard diagnostic procedures like 
amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS).3 Nevertheless, 
the genetic information available to prospective parents (PPs) 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Ignatia B. Van den Veyver, Recent Advances in Prenatal Genetic 
Screening and Testing, F1000RESEARCH, Oct. 28, 2016, at 3 (noting the 
“unprecedented rapid evolution” of certain forms of genetic testing). 
 2. See id. at 5 (noting that non-invasive tests are a recent development). 
 3. See id. at 4 (noting that “likely because of intense marketing, many 
women are being offered cffDNA screening, irrespective of a priori risk, and [as a 
result] the number of diagnostic procedures performed has dramatically 
declined”). According to Van den Veyver, NIPT has prompted many women to 
forego confirmatory testing entirely. See id. at 5. 
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today is still largely limited to targeted testing for severe 
early-onset conditions.4 But the emergence of prenatal whole 
genome sequencing (PWGS) will eliminate the barriers between 
targeted testing and testing for everything.5 Soon, it will be 
possible to interrogate an entire fetal genome.6 As PWGS 
transforms the pregnancy experience, PPs can anticipate access to 
an incredible amount of genetic information about their 
offspring—from late-onset medical conditions like breast cancer, to 
manageable medical conditions like hemochromatosis, to 
non-medical traits like athletic ability, to aesthetic characteristics 
like eye color.7 While some technical barriers remain, clinical 
availability of prenatal whole genome sequencing (PWGS) is now 
a question of “when,” not “if.”8 And by most accounts, “when” may 
be in as few as five years.9 
PWGS presages a paradigm shift.10 Genetic information will 
become far more accessible, but its contents will be less 
                                                                                                     
 4. See id. at 6 (“Thus, until non-invasive tests become more accurate and 
comprehensive, the growing trend of replacing diagnostic testing with cffDNA 
screening comes at a cost of missed prenatal genetic diagnoses.”). 
 5. See Lisa Hui & Diana W. Bianchi, Recent Advances in the Prenatal 
Interrogation of the Human Fetal Genome, 29 TRENDS GENETICS 84, 84–91 (2013) 
(noting the increases in “overcom[ing] several major technical barriers to the 
non-invasive assessment of the whole fetal genome”). 
 6. See id. (noting the increases in interrogating the human fetal genome). 
 7. Hemochromatosis is a commonly inherited condition caused by 
mutations in the HFE gene that can be easily and effectively managed if 
treatment is initiated early enough. See M.J. Burt et al., The Significance of 
Haemochromatosis Gene Mutations in the General Population: Implications for 
Screening, 43 BMJ 830, 835 (1998). 
 8. See Malorye Allison, Genomic Testing Reaches into the Womb, 31 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 595, 600 (2013) (noting the likelihood that whole genome 
sequencing will soon be utilized). 
 9. See id. (suggesting eventual routinization of PWGS, but stating that 
“[w]hether it’s 5, 10, or 20 years is more difficult to say”); Elaine R. Mardis, The 
Impact of Next-Generation Sequencing Technology on Genetics, 24 TRENDS 
GENETICS 133, 134 (2008) (stating that next-generation sequencing “will provide 
a comprehensive picture of normal human genome variation in the next few 
years”); John A. Robertson, The $1000 Genome: Ethical and Legal Issues in 
Whole-Genome Sequencing of Individuals, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2003, at 35, 
36 [hereinafter The $1000 Genome] (estimating the timeframe for clinical 
availability of WGS at ten to fifteen years). 
 10. See Hui & Bianchi, supra note 5, at 84–91 (noting that PWGS will create 
more data). 
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understood.11 Indeed, even in professional populations genetic 
literacy is low.12 Clinicians report feeling inadequately prepared to 
order genetic tests, to interpret genetic results, and to counsel their 
patients.13 Likely, their concerns are warranted.14 Genetics is an 
entirely separate specialty from obstetrics and gynecology, and 
surveys show that most OB/GYNs have received little or no 
genetics training.15 To compound the problem, the United States is 
facing a shortage of genetics experts.16 The number of clinical 
geneticists (the specialists most directly involved with patient 
care)17 is decreasing just as the volume of patients utilizing genetic 
technologies is increasing.18 There is also a well-documented 
                                                                                                     
 11. See id. (“Whatever technological platform is eventually used to assess 
the fetus, whether targeted or whole genome, data interpretation, storage, and 
management will be major challenges for future clinicians and diagnostic 
services.”). 
 12. Julia L. Piechan et al., NIPT and Informed Consent: An Assessment of 
Patient Understanding of a Negative NIPT Result, 25 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 
1127, 1135 (2016). 
 13. See Michelle J. Bayefsky et al., Views of American OB/GYNs on the 
Ethics of Prenatal Whole-Genome Sequencing, 36 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1250, 1253 
(2016) (“Furthermore, a large majority of OB/GYNs believe that they will not have 
sufficient resources to interpret and communicate PWGS results.”). 
 14. See id. (“Prenatal whole-genome sequencing will vastly increase the 
amount of information we can learn about a fetus’s genome, which could have 
far-reaching societal consequences.”). 
 15. See id. (noting the unfamiliarity of most OBGYNs with genetic data). 
 16. See Wynter K. Miller, Note, Trust and Anti-Trust: State-Based 
Restrictions in Telemedicine, 50 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1807, 1813 & nn.37–43 
(2017) (“The United States is facing an impending healthcare crisis: there are not 
enough doctors.”). 
 17. Judith A. Cooksey et al., The Medical Genetics Workforce: An Analysis of 
Clinical Geneticist Subgroups, 8 GENETICS MED. 603, 603 (2006) (“MD clinical 
geneticists comprise the primary medical specialist group trained and certified in 
clinical genetics.”). 
 18. Clinical genetics has historically attracted fewer physicians than other 
specialties. Further, the typical geneticist’s patient load “is substantially smaller 
than that reported by physicians practicing in other specialties,” perhaps due in 
part to differences in time allocation. Id. On average, geneticists allocate seven 
hours to each new patient and three-and-a-half hours to follow-up. See V.L. 
Hannig et al., Expansion of Genetic Services Utilizing a General Genetic 
Counseling Clinic, 23 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 64, 64 (2014) (“[A]n average of 7 h 
was spent on each new genetics patient (including all time spent by all 
professionals) and 3.5 h on each follow up patient.”). By contrast, the average 
pediatrician spends between eleven and twenty minutes with each patient; the 
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shortage of Master’s-level genetic counselors.19 In short, the supply 
of geneticists is insufficient to meet current demand, let alone 
provide adequate counseling to the millions of PPs making 
reproductive decisions each year.20 By necessity, geneticists will 
not be the only professionals, or even the primary professionals, 
offering genetic testing to PPs.21 Obstetricians and other prenatal 
providers will need to act as genetic gatekeepers.22 How they 
perform that role—what they say to patients and when they say 
it—is the focus of this Article.23 
This issue warrants attention because the implications of 
PWGS are not limited to the medical landscape.24 PWGS is also 
injecting new urgency into an entrenched political debate.25 For 
well over a century, abortion has been one of the most radioactive 
issues in America.26 Its legal status—specifically, the legality or 
                                                                                                     
average internist spends twenty-six minutes. See David C. Dugdale et al., Time 
and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S34, S36 
(1999) (discussing patient visit lengths); Gery P. Guy Jr. & Lisa C. Richardson, 
Visit Duration for Outpatient Physician Office Visits Among Patients with Cancer, 
8 J. ONCOLOGY PRACTICE 2s, 7s tbl.3 (2012) (comparing average time spent with 
patients by oncologists (24.7 minutes) versus non-oncologists (21.1 minutes)). 
 19. See Benjamin E. Berkman & Michelle Bayefsky, Prenatal Whole Genome 
Sequencing: An Argument for Professional Self-Regulation, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 
2017, at 26, 26–27 (noting “the well-documented dearth of genetic counselors”). 
In a comprehensive national survey of the genetics workforce, Cooksey et al. 
found that geneticists rely heavily on genetic counselors with respect to patient 
care. Indeed, most geneticists have three or more genetic counselors on staff, and 
64% to 77% of geneticists report that genetic counselors see many or all of their 
new patients. Cooksey et al., supra note 17, at 609. 
 20. See Berkman & Bayefsky, supra note 19, at 26–27 (noting that the 
medical community lacks enough geneticists). 
 21. See id. (“[G]iven the well-documented dearth of genetic counselors, there 
is reason for concern that doctors will have to rely on genetic counseling services 
provided by the genetic testing companies themselves.”). 
 22. See id. (noting that prenatal providers will have to interact with genetic 
testing companies to determine how to relay information to patients). 
 23. See infra Parts II–IV.  
 24. See Berkman & Bayefsky, supra note 19, at 26–28 (noting the interplay 
between abortion and PWGS). 
 25. See id. (noting, among other arguments, that PWGS may lead to 
arguments “that aborting affected fetuses amounts to disability discrimination”). 
 26. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Abortion: A Polarizing, Emotional Debate 41 
Years After Court Ruling, CNN (Jan. 22, 2014) 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/22/politics/abortion/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 
2019) (noting that abortion has remained a controversial issue for many years) 
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illegality of its performance—stands as “the coveted jewel in the 
political crown.”27 Roe v. Wade28 stands as a bulwark against 
outright bans.29 Thus, the “general strategy” of pro-life advocates 
has been to make abortion harder—“harder legally, financially, 
emotionally, and practically.”30 Historically, pro-life legislators 
sought to construct legal hardships by way of logistical 
obstacles— e.g., mandatory waiting periods,31 hospital-admitting 
privilege requirements,32 insurance coverage restrictions,33 
state-mandated counseling,34 parental notification,35 and the 
                                                                                                     
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27. CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA xi (2017). 
 28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29. See id. at 166–67 (stating that abortions cannot be criminalized in 
certain situations). 
 30. See Sanger, supra note 27, at xi (describing the strategy of some pro-life 
advocates). 
 31. In 1992, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting 
period under Roe’s undue burden standard. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992). Today, twenty-seven states require observance 
of a waiting period between when a woman receives pre-abortion counseling and 
when the abortion is performed. In fourteen states, the waiting period is of 
sufficient duration (e.g., laws in Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, and Utah mandate a 72-hour waiting period) so as to require two 
separate trips to the clinic. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws (last 
updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (describing the abortion laws of 
many states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 31 (“19 states require an 
abortion to be performed in a hospital after a specified point in the pregnancy.”). 
 33. See id. (“11 states restrict coverage of abortion in private insurance 
plans.”). 
 34. See id. (“18 states mandate that women be given counseling before an 
abortion.”). 
 35. See id. (“37 states require some type of parental involvement in a minor’s 
decision to have an abortion.”). 
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like.36 Though markedly effective in many cases,37 logistical 
obstacles have nonetheless failed to secure for pro-lifers the 
coveted jewel: Roe’s overturn.38 And so, the hardship construction 
project continues.39 
In this context, states have begun to legislate.40 In 1923, 
Rudyard Kipling infamously described words as “the most 
powerful drug used by mankind.”41 Perhaps in cognizance of the 
power of words, physician speech has recently become a target for 
anti-abortion regulation.42 Texas, for example, compels physicians 
to warn pregnant women that an abortion may increase their risk 
                                                                                                     
 36. According to the Guttmacher Institute, nineteen states require abortions 
to be performed in a hospital after a specified point in the pregnancy (usually 
viability); eleven states restrict coverage of abortion in private insurance plans; 
eighteen states mandate pre-abortion counseling; and thirty-seven states require 
parental consent or notification. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 31 
(providing an overview of abortion law in the United States). 
 37. Logistical obstacles tend to “have a dramatic impact on women who live 
farthest from major metropolitan areas.” See Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, 
Urbannormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 
30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 79 (2015) (discussing the disproportionate 
toll abortion restriction laws have on women who are both rural and poor); see 
also Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When 
Protecting Health Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1449–50 (2016) 
(assessing so-called TRAP laws (i.e., targeted regulation of abortion providers) in 
the Casey framework and concluding that “the practical impact of these health 
restrictions . . . is to dramatically shrink abortion providers’ infrastructure, 
clos[e] clinics and disabl[e] doctors”). 
 38. See Caldwell, supra note 26 (noting that Roe has not been overturned).  
 39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that “construction” 
projects continue). 
 40. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.012 
(2003) (requiring certain warnings to be given prior to an abortion). 
 41. Rudyard Kipling, Surgeons and the Soul, in A BOOK OF WORDS 237, 237 
(2007). A similar sentiment has guided the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Perhaps most famously, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in Whitney 
v. California, “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies . . . the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” 274 
U.S. 357, 377 (1927). See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “the theory of our Constitution” calls for 
vigilance against attempts to stymie “free trade in ideas”); Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[F]reedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all.”). 
 42. See Woman’s Right to Know Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.012 
(2003) (requiring certain warnings to be given prior to an abortion).  
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of developing breast cancer,43 despite an absence of medical 
authority supporting the claim.44 
South Dakota’s legislature decided that women seeking 
abortions may be subject to “clouded judgement, and a willingness 
to violate conscience.”45 The state thus compels physicians to warn 
women that an abortion may increase their risk for suicidal 
ideation and suicide.46 The medical evidence supporting a link 
between abortion and negative mental health sequelae is similarly 
lacking.47 More recently, states have begun to consider abortion 
bans on the basis of fetal genetic abnormalities (ABGAs).48 
These recent legislative attempts to regulate physician speech 
were undertaken in response to emerging prenatal testing 
technologies. In 2011, pregnant women in the United States gained 
access to NIPT, a new technology that makes fetal genetic testing 
easier than ever before.49 The first ABGAs were introduced near 
                                                                                                     
 43. See id. (“Consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed only if the 
physician who is to perform the abortion informs the pregnant woman . . . [of] the 
possibility of increased risk of breast cancer following an induced abortion and 
the natural protective effect of a completed pregnancy in avoiding breast 
cancer.”). 
 44. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (ACOG), Committee 
Opinion No. 434: Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer, 113 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1417, 1417 (2009), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Gynecologic-
Practice/co434.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20190416T1638572043 (“[R]igorous recent studies 
demonstrate no causal relationship between induced abortion and a subsequent 
increase in breast cancer risk.”). 
 45. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2005) (“The Legislature further finds 
that a woman seeking to terminate the life of her unborn child may be subject to 
pressures which can cause an emotional crisis, undue reliance on the advice of 
others, clouded judgment, and a willingness to violate conscience to avoid those 
pressures.”). 
 46. See id. (listing the written notices that a doctor must provide to the 
patient).  
 47. See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health 
Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 448–49 
(2008) (“A clear trend emerges from this systematic review: the highest quality 
studies had findings that were mostly neutral, suggesting few, if any, differences 
between aborters and their respective comparison groups in terms of mental 
health sequelae.”). 
 48. See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text (discussing state 
legislation attempting to restrict abortions). 
 49. See infra Part I (explaining how NIPT is less invasive and more cost 
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instantaneously. Indeed, the national pro-life organization 
Americans United for Life drafted and disseminated model 
legislation for ABGAs a mere three months after NIPT became 
clinically available.50 In 2013, North Dakota became the first state 
to outlaw abortions “because the unborn child has been diagnosed 
with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic 
abnormality.”51 Within the last five years, twenty-two states have 
considered similar legislation.52 Some states’ considerations have 
been dogged. Missouri unsuccessfully attempted to pass some 
version of an ABGA in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017.53 In 
January of 2018, Missouri State Senator David Sater and State 
Representative Shamed Dogan introduced an ABGA identical to 
the one that failed in 2017, which was identical to the one that 
                                                                                                     
effective compared to other genetic testing methods). 
 50. See North Dakota Becomes First State to Limit Abortions Based on 
Sex-Selection and Genetic Abnormalities Using AUL Model Legislation, AM. 
UNITED FOR LIFE (Mar. 26, 2013), https://aul.org/2013/03/26/north-dakota-
becomes-first-state-to-limit-abortions-based-on-sex-selection-and-genetic-
abnormalities-using-aul-model-legislation/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (praising 
North Dakota for following AUL’s model legislation) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 51. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(b) (2012). 
 52. See Mary A. Scott, Hard Choices: Where to Draw the Line on Limiting 
Selection in the Selective Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
1211, 1219 (2016) (listing the states that have considered legislation similar to 
North Dakota); these states are Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. 
 53. See Legislative Tracker, REWIRE NEWS, https://rewire.news/legislative-
tracker/law-topic/genetic-anomalies-abortion-ban/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) 
(listing the status of ABGA legislation at the state level) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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failed in 2016.54 Currently, four states—Indiana,55 Louisiana,56 
North Dakota,57 and Ohio58—have passed ABGAs, and four more 
(counting Missouri) pre-filed 2018 proposals.59 
In most respects, ABGAs are broad and punitive. In the case 
of North Dakota, for example, “genetic abnormality” is defined as 
“any defect, disease, or disorder that is inherited genetically. The 
term includes any physical disfigurement, scoliosis, dwarfism, 
Down syndrome, albinism, amelia, or any other type of physical or 
mental disability, abnormality, or disease.”60 The penalties for 
performing an abortion on genetic grounds include revocation of 
medical license, a year in prison, a fine of $3,000, or any 
combination of the three.61 In a technical sense, laws like North 
                                                                                                     
 54. Compare S.B. 724, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018) 
(introducing a companion bill to H.B. 1867 (2018) that is identical to S.B. 96 
(2017)), with S.B. 96, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017) (introducing a 
bill that was nearly identical to its predecessors, S.B. 802 and H.B. 1815, both of 
which failed to pass in 2016). 
 55. See IND. CODE § 16-18-2-1.5 (2016) (presenting Indiana’s ABGA); 
Indiana’s provision was passed as part of an omnibus bill that was enjoined, but 
ostensibly the genetic abnormality ban remains in effect per the bill’s severability 
provision. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t 
of Health, 273 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1043 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (granting preliminary 
injunction that prohibits the State from enforcing a portion of the omnibus bill, 
but does not affect § 16-18-2-1.5), aff’d, 896 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 56. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.1.1 (2016) (presenting Louisiana’s ABGA). 
 57. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(b) (2012) (presenting North 
Dakota’s ABGA). 
 58. See 2017 Ohio Laws 29 (presenting Ohio’s ABGA). However, Ohio was 
“enjoined from implementing and enforcing [the bill].” Preterm-Cleveland v. 
Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 758 (S.D. Ohio 2018); see Lauren del Valle, Ohio 
Judge Blocks Legislation Preventing Abortions in Down Syndrome Cases, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/14/health/court-block-ohio-abortion-down-
syndrome/index.html (last updated Mar.14, 2018, 8:58 PM) (last visited Apr. 16, 
2019) (summarizing Preterm-Cleveland) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 59. See H.B. 4210, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018) (introducing an 
ABGA); S.B. 1430, 56th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2018) (same); S.B. 1867, 99th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018) (same); H. 4833, 122nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (S.C. 2018) (same). 
 60. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02(7) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 61. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-01 (2018) (defining penalties for 
Class A misdemeanors); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 43-17-30.1 (2018) (defining 
disciplinary action and grounds therefor).  
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Dakota’s might have profound effects on the pregnancy experience 
in that state. Imagine that a woman living in North Dakota 
discovers she is pregnant. At her first prenatal exam, around the 
tenth week of gestation, she furnishes her OB/GYN with a vial of 
blood. Depending on the case load of her provider, and the 
availability of a genetic counselor, she may or may not be told what 
the blood test is for and the type of results she should be prepared 
to receive. Given that there are five prenatal genetic counselors 
currently employed in North Dakota, it is unlikely she will receive 
anything close to sufficient counseling.62 Five to eight days after 
her appointment, the woman gets a phone call. She is told that the 
results of her blood test show there is an increased risk that she is 
carrying a baby with a genetic condition called trisomy 18. She is 
told that babies with trisomy 18 usually die in utero or within the 
first month of life, but 5–10% live past their first year, often with 
severe physical and intellectual disabilities.63 If the woman opts 
for confirmatory testing, she will be scheduled for a CVS shortly 
thereafter.64 But because she lives in North Dakota, if CVS gives a 
definitive diagnosis of trisomy 18, the woman will be unable, as a 
matter of state law, to terminate the pregnancy.65 The same would 
be true if the baby had Down syndrome or trisomy 13.66 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Find a Genetic Counselor, NAT’L SOC’Y GENETIC COUNS., 
https://www.nsgc.org/page/find-a-gc-search (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) (setting 
search criteria in the State/Province field for “North Dakota” and Types of 
Specialization field for “Prenatal”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 63. See Trisomy 18, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/trisomy-18 (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) 
(discussing the life expectancy and side-effects of individuals diagnosed with 
Trisomy 18) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 64. See Chromosome Study from Amniotic Fluid and CVS, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECH. INFO., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gtr/tests/556622/ (last updated 
July 4, 2018) (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) (providing an overview of the prenatal 
test and listing the conditions that it diagnoses) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 65. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(b) (2012) (“[A] physician may 
not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge that 
the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely . . . [b]ecause the unborn child 
has been diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic 
abnormality.”). 
 66. Trisomy 13 is a disorder associated with heart defects, brain or spinal 
cord abnormalities, very small or poorly developed eyes, extra fingers or toes, an 
opening in the lip or roof of the mouth, and weak muscle tone. See Trisomy 13, 
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With PWGS’s inevitable clinical adoption, the above scenario 
would change in two respects. First, the woman might receive a 
positive prenatal diagnosis for any number of genetic disorders 
above and beyond what NIPT can currently screen for, such as 
Huntington’s disease (a fatal genetic disorder that usually 
manifests after age 30), depression, Duchenne Muscular 
Dystrophy, schizophrenia, breast cancer, malignant hyperthermia, 
autism, diabetes, bipolar disorder—the list is near limitless.67 
Second, though she might receive her diagnosis at the same time 
(i.e., the tenth week of gestation), she would not need an 
amniocentesis or CVS to confirm.68 All it would take is a blood 
test.69 Under laws like North Dakota’s, regardless of the medical 
severity of the condition, this woman would be legally barred from 
pursuing an abortion.70 
The demonstrated eagerness of pro-lifers to apply the “general 
strategy” in ever-imaginative ways suggests that these first 
attempts to control NIPT presage an equally vigorous legislative 
response to PWGS. The genomic era will not be exempt from 
abortion politics. As such, it is clearly not too soon to talk about 
free speech, genetic gatekeepers, and PWGS. This Article explores 
the First Amendment questions PWGS is likely to raise. It argues 
that most of the foreseeable options for state intervention in 
conversations between physicians and PPs about genetic 
sequencing should trigger at least heightened scrutiny. Part I 
provides an overview of the most recent advances in genetic 
                                                                                                     
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/trisomy-13# (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (providing an overview of Trisomy 13) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. See What Is Noninvasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) and What disorders 
Can It Screen For?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/nipt (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (providing 
an overview of NIPT and discussing their limitations) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 68. See Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal 
Anomaly?: Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the 
Age of Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 297 
(2013) (discussing trends and major breakthroughs in the field of whole-genome 
sequencing). 
 69. See id. (explaining the benefits of whole-genome sequencing). 
 70. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
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testing. It assesses the ongoing impact of NIPT for providers and 
patients and charts the course from NIPT to PWGS. Part II 
establishes a foundational background for evaluating First 
Amendment claims. Part II.A describes the development of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the doctrinal distinctions 
between levels of judicial scrutiny. Part II.B explores historical 
Supreme Court case law addressing professional speech. Part III 
surveys the current legal landscape. Using a handful of recent 
Circuit cases, Part III.A demonstrates that the legal frameworks 
for assessing physician speech qua professional speech are 
shambolic. Part III.B provides an overview of the most recent 
Supreme Court ruling on professional speech in the 2018 case 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.71 Part 
IV uses the material in Parts I–III to predict how legislative efforts 
to limit reproductive decision-making are likely to manifest in the 
PWGS context. Based on the case analyses in Part III, Part IV 
identifies the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit approaches as the most 
defensible for future judicial interventions. This Article concludes 
that state-based restrictions on PWGS-related speech would be 
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges and unlikely to survive 
heightened judicial scrutiny. 
II. Advancements in Prenatal Genetics 
It has long been standard practice to offer genetic testing to 
pregnant women.72 Until recently, amniocentesis and chorionic 
villus sampling (CVS) were the available offerings.73 Both involve 
                                                                                                     
 71. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 72. ACOG recommends first trimester screening for all pregnant women. See 
Committee Opinion No. 693: Counseling About Genetic Testing and 
Communication of Genetic Test Results, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, 
https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Genetics/Counseling-About-Genetic-Testing-and-
Communication-of-Genetic-Test-Results (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) [hereinafter 
Committee Opinion No. 693] (noting that prenatal screenings “have been routine 
components of prenatal care for several decades”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 73. See What Is NIPT?, GENETICS EDUC. PROGRAMME (Dec. 18, 2017, 12:15 
PM), https://www.genomicseducation.hee.nhs.uk/news/item/403-what-is-nipt/ 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing the differences between NIPT and invasive 
screening techniques) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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inserting a large needle into the uterus and both are associated 
with high levels of fear and anxiety amongst pregnant women.74 
Perhaps more critically, both tests are classified as diagnostic 
rather than screening tests.75 And the distinction between 
“diagnostic” and “screening” is more than semantic. Diagnostic 
tests identify abnormalities with higher levels of confidence than 
screening tests but are also more invasive and involve a 
measurable risk of miscarriage.76 
In the late 1990s, there was great interest in developing safer 
alternatives to amniocentesis and CVS. In 1997, Dennis Lo and 
Noemi Corbetta discovered circulating fetal DNA (i.e., cell-free 
fetal DNA or “cffDNA”) in maternal plasma and serum.77 Their 
discovery demonstrated that it was possible to screen the fetus for 
genetic conditions using a blood sample from the mother.78 Prior to 
1997, fetal DNA samples were obtainable only by invasive 
extraction from the mother’s amniotic fluid (amniocentesis) or 
placenta (CVS).79 Subsequent work by Lo et al. indicated that 
plasma DNA analysis—now called NIPT—was less susceptible 
than amniocentesis or CVS to false-positive results.80 
                                                                                                     
 74. See P. Sarkar et al., Maternal Anxiety at Amniocentesis and Plasma 
Cortisol, 26 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 505, 506 (2006) (discussing the physiological 
effect that amniocentesis has on pregnant women). 
 75. See CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., FACT SHEET 26: DIAGNOSTIC TESTS DURING 
PREGNANCY 1–2 (2018). 
 76. The risk of miscarriage occurs at a rate of .22% and .25% for CVS and 
amniocentesis, respectively. See Marion S. Verp, Prenatal Genetic Screening and 
Diagnostic Testing, in PRENATAL & PREIMPLANTATION DIAGNOSIS: THE BURDEN OF 
CHOICE 18–22 (Joann Paley Gast & Marion S. Verp eds., 2015); ACOG, Practice 
Bulletin No. 162: Prenatal Diagnostic Testing for Genetic Disorders, 127 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY e108, e111–12 (2016). 
 77. See Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Presence of Fetal DNA in Maternal Plasma 
and Serum, 350 LANCET 485, 486–87 (1997) (discussing the results of the 
experiment). 
 78. See id. at 485 (discussing the implications of discovering cffDNA). 
 79. See Rossa W.K. Chiu et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Assessment of Trisomy 
21 by Multiplexed Maternal Plasma DNA Sequencing: Large Scale Validity Study, 
2011 BMJ 342, 342 (2011) (discussing the available methods for prenatal 
diagnosis of trisomy 21). 
 80. See Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Rapid Clearance of Fetal DNA from Maternal 
Plasma, 64 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 218, 223 (1999) (discussing the benefits of 
plasma DNA analysis). 
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The discovery of cffDNA has drastically altered the pregnancy 
experience. Today, invasive diagnostic tests are rarely a first-line 
offer.81 In most cases, amniocentesis and CVS are offered 
selectively for reasons like advanced maternal age or an abnormal 
screening result, or upon explicit patient request.82 Instead, access 
to fetal genetic information that once required an invasive 
outpatient procedure—as well as a small but cognizable risk of 
fetal injury or loss—is now attainable with a simple blood test.83 
A. From Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing . . . 
Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) is technically classified 
as a screening method (versus a diagnostic test).84 But it offers “an 
information load approaching that of invasive diagnostic genetic 
tests.”85 Since its clinical introduction in 2011,86 a handful of 
commercial providers have established a robust market for NIPT.87 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Amniocentesis, MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/amniocentesis/about/pac-20392914 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (explaining the circumstances in which amniocentesis 
may be appropriate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. Cf. EMILY OSTER, EXPECTING BETTER: WHY CONVENTIONAL PREGNANCY 
WISDOM IS WRONG—AND WHAT YOU REALLY NEED TO KNOW 121 (2014) (noting 
that even given explicit patient requests, physicians and insurers are often 
reluctant to provide invasive testing to women under 35). 
 83. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Mollie A. Minear et al., Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Testing: 
Current and Emerging Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, 16 ANN. REV. GENOMICS 
& HUM. GENETICS 369, 371 (2015) (stating that clinical guidelines emphasize that 
NIPT is a screening test and discussing recommendations by some professional 
societies to change the abbreviation to NIPS). Non-Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis 
(NIPD) also refers to the same technique. 
 85. Id. at 370. 
 86. Hong Kong was the first to offer clinical access to NIPT in August 2011. 
It was available in the U.S. in October 2011. See Megan Allyse et al., Non-Invasive 
Prenatal Testing: A Review of International Implementation and Challenges, 7 
INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 113, 114 (2015) (discussing the origins and 
commercialization of NIPT). 
 87. The global market value for NIPT reached an estimated $1.19 billion in 
2015. See Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing Market to Gain from Enhanced Demand 
in End-Use Industries Till 2025: Grand View Research, ABNEWSWIRE (Mar. 30, 
2017), http://www.abnewswire.com/pressreleases/noninvasive-prenatal-testing-
market-to-gain-from-enhanced-demand-in-enduse-industries-till-2025-grand-
view-research-inc_107221.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (highlighting the 
growth of the NIPT market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
592 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577 (2019) 
 
The leading U.S.-based providers have proprietary informatics on 
their respective products,88 but in terms of content, NIPT panels 
are roughly comparable. NIPT generally screens for the three most 
common trisomies,89 certain sex chromosome abnormalities90 and 
microdeletions,91 and select inherited diseases.92 By some 
                                                                                                     
North America holds the largest revenue share at 47%. See Allyse et al., supra 
note 86, at 115 (providing market share statistics); GRAND VIEW RESEARCH, 
NON-INVASIVE PRENATAL TESTING (NIPT) MARKET ANALYSIS (2016), 
http://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/noninvasive-prenatal-testi
ng-market. 
 88. For an expanded discussion and comparison of the different approaches 
for conducting NIPT and the various bioinformatics platforms for post-hoc data 
analysis, see Errol R. Norwitz & Brynn Levy, Noninvasive Prenatal Testing: The 
Future Is Now, 6 REVS. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 48, 56 (2013) (“Each entity 
utilizes a unique and proprietary algorithm for interpretation of the genetic 
data.”). For an overview of the NIPT intellectual property landscape, see Ashwin 
Agarwal et al., Commercial Landscape of Noninvasive Prenatal Testing in the 
United States, 33 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 521, 524–27 (2013) (identifying active 
patents with claims covering uses of cffDNA for prenatal genetic testing and 
discussing ongoing patent litigation). 
 89. NIPT screening is widely available for Down syndrome (trisomy 21), 
Patau syndrome (trisomy 13), and Edwards syndrome (trisomy 18). Trisomies 9 
and 16 are also included on NIPT panels, but less commonly. See NIPT Education 
for Health Care Professionals—FAQ, ILLUMINA, 
https://www.illumina.com/clinical/reproductive-genetic-health/nipt/healthcare-
providers.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (screening for trisomies 13, 18, and 21, 
but not screening for trisomies 9 or 16) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 90. For example, monosomy X (Turner syndrome), Klinefelter syndrome (47, 
XXY), Triple X syndrome, and Jacob’s syndrome (47, XYY). See id. (listing the 
conditions that NIPT can identify). 
 91. Microdeletions are chromosome deletions that occur randomly (e.g., 
regardless of genetic risk factors, maternal age, or race) and can (but do not 
always) produce negative effects. NIPT panels screen for the 5 most common 
microdeletions: 22q11.2 syndrome (DiGeorge syndrome), 1p36 syndrome, 15q11.2 
syndrome (Angelman syndrome and Prader-Willi syndrome), 4p-syndrome 
(Wolf-Hirschhorn syndrome), and 5p-syndrome (Cri du Chat syndrome). See 
Microdeletion: The Genetic Disorder You’ll Want to Know About Before Birth, 
WHAT TO EXPECT, https://www.whattoexpect.com/pregnancy/microdeletion/ (last 
updated Nov. 11, 2018) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (listing the types of 
microdeletions that NIPT can identify) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 92. In May 2017, Natera announced the launch of a new NIPT test 
(“Vistara”) capable of screening for 30 single-gene mutations, including Noonan 
syndrome, osteogenesis imperfecta, craniosynostosis syndromes, achondroplasia, 
and Rett syndrome. See Natera, Inc. Announces Launch of Vistara Single-Gene 
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estimates, NIPT screening reduces the need for invasive testing by 
as much as 90%,93 and greatly improves overall pregnancy 
management.94 Early clinical experiences with NIPT have been 
positive,95 and reinforced by aggressive marketing practices, 
consumer demand for NIPT is strong.96 Intuitively, it is 
                                                                                                     
Mutation NIPT, NATERA (May 8, 2017), https://www.natera.com/press-
releases/natera-inc-announces-launch-vistara-single-gene-mutation-nipt (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing Vistara’s expanded capabilities compared to 
other NIPT) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 93. See Pam Belluck, Test Is Improved Predictor of Fetal Disorders, N.Y. 
TIMES WELL BLOG, https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/new-dna-test-
better-at-predicting-some-disorders-in-babies-study-finds/ (last updated Feb. 27, 
2014) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Nine out of 10 women who are currently being 
referred for further testing would not need invasive tests.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 94. See Joris Robert Vermeesch et al., Prenatal and Pre-implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis, 17 NATURE REVS.: GENETICS 643, 646 (2016) (discussing how 
NIPT results “yield valuable information on both fetal and maternal 
health . . . [which] substantially improve overall pregnancy management”). For 
example, several studies indicate NIPT may also accurately screen for other fetal 
aneuploidies (e.g., trisomies 7, 15, and 16), and occult malignancy and 
presymptomatic cancer in pregnant women. See Frédéric Amant et al., 
Presymptomatic Identification of Cancers in Pregnant Women During 
Noninvasive Prenatal Testing, 1 JAMA ONCOLOGY 814, 814 (2015) (showing that 
NIPT may also enable screening for presymptomatic maternal tumors—e.g., 
ovarian carcinoma, follicular lymphoma, and Hodgkin lymphoma); Baran 
Bayindir et al., Noninvasive Prenatal Testing Using a Novel Analysis Pipeline to 
Screen for All Autosomal Fetal Aneuploidies Improves Pregnancy Management, 
23 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1286, 1291 (2015) (demonstrating NIPT identification 
for trisomies other than 13, 18, and 21); Diana W. Bianchi et al., Noninvasive 
Prenatal Testing and Incidental Detection of Occult Maternal Malignancies, 314 
JAMA 162, 168 (2015) (demonstrating NIPT detection of asymptomatic occult 
malignancy in 3 out of 8 pregnant women). 
 95. See GARETH M. THOMAS, NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, 
DECISION-MAKING BY EXPECTANT PARENTS: NIPT, NIPD, AND CURRENT METHODS 
OF PRENATAL SCREENING FOR DOWN’S SYNDROME (EVIDENCE REVIEW) (2016), 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/98686/1/Gareth-Thomas-evidence-review-decision-making-
NIPT.pdf (collecting studies reporting women’s positive experiences of NIPT); 
Celine Lewis et al., Women’s Experiences and Preferences for Service Delivery of 
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy in a Public Health Setting: A Mixed 
Methods Study, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 8 (2016) (finding that pregnant interviewees were 
“overwhelmingly positive” about NIPT); Ellika Sahlin et al., Positive Attitudes 
towards Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) in a Swedish Cohort of 1,003 
Pregnant Women, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 10 (2016) (concluding that the “overwhelming 
majority” of interviewees viewed NIPT positively). 
 96. See Blake Murdoch et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing and the 
Unveiling of an Impaired Translation Process, 39 J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 
CAN. 10, 12–14 (2017) (citing evidence that commercial pressure and perceived 
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unsurprising that PPs broadly favor incorporating NIPT into 
standard patient care. After all, when confronted with a 22-gauge 
needle or transvaginal probe, it is not difficult to believe that many 
women would opt instead for a quick blood draw. 
Notwithstanding its realized and potential benefits, however, 
NIPT has considerable limitations. It does not, for instance, screen 
for neural tube defects;97 early onset preeclampsia;98 or structural 
abnormalities including physical defects of the heart, abdominal 
wall, and skeleton.99 NIPT cannot detect the vast majority of 
chromosomal abnormalities or most inherited diseases, and its 
results are less reliable in cases of fetal and placental mosaicism,100 
twin pregnancies,101 and maternal obesity.102 Essentially, NIPT is 
“a very good screening test for what it’s designed to screen 
                                                                                                     
risk of legal liability can drive uptake, influence public and professional opinion, 
and bias research outcomes). 
 97. See Jean Gekas et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Fetal 
Chromosome Abnormalities: Review of Clinical and Ethical Issues, 9 APPLICATION 
CLINICAL GENETICS 15, 19 (2016) (discussing the limitations of NIPT screening). 
 98. See Wybo Dondorp et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy 
and Beyond: Challenges of Responsible Innovation in Prenatal Screening, 23 EUR. 
J. HUM. GENETICS 1438, 1442 (2015) (comparing NIPT and combined first 
trimester screening and noting that only the latter tests for pregnancy 
complication risks, e.g., pre-eclampsia or intra-uterine growth retardation). 
 99. See A. Theresa Wittman et al., Patient Perception of Negative 
Noninvasive Prenatal Testing Results, 6 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY REPS. e391, e395 
(2016) (discussing the nuances in patient comprehension regarding NIPT’s 
inability to screen for nonstructural and structural abnormalities). 
 100. See Peter Benn, Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing Using Cell Free DNA in 
Maternal Plasma: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, 3 J. CLINICAL MED. 
537, 550 (2014) (“Discordancy due to undetected mosaicism can be expected to 
arise regardless of which NIPT methodology is used.”). 
 101. See id. at 548 (noting that while NIPT’s performance is unaffected in 
cases of monozygotic twins, “[f]or dizygotic twins and higher multiples NIPT is 
more problematic”). But see Tze Kin Lau et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Screening 
of Fetal Down Syndrome by Maternal Plasma DNA Sequencing in Twin 
Pregnancies, 26 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 434, 436 (2013) (arguing 
that NIPT detection of fetal aneuploidy from maternal plasma is “theoretically 
feasible” in twin pregnancies but acknowledging that “direct proof is lacking”). 
 102. See Mary C. Livergood et al., Obesity and Cell-Free DNA “No Calls”: Is 
There an Optimal Gestational Age at Time of Sampling?, 216 AM. J. OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 413.e1, 413.e3 (2017) (confirming a lower NIPT detection rate of 
abnormalities among overweight and obese women as compared to normal-weight 
women). 
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for”— but it is designed to screen for a small number of medically 
severe conditions.103 NIPT thus represents only an incremental 
shift in the practice of prenatal genetic testing. NIPT’s recent and 
arguably premature clinical uptake has only intensified consumer 
demand for more expansive genetic forecasting.104 NIPT is meant 
to supplement rather than replace traditional screening, at least 
in its current iteration.105 But NIPT’s demonstrated commercial 
viability has had a galvanizing effect on fetal genomic research. 
Less than a year after NIPT’s debut, researchers began developing 
true replacements for amniocentesis and CVS.106 Since 2011, 
several independent studies have successfully demonstrated 
proof-of-principle that it is possible to use NIPT to non-invasively 
sequence the whole prenatal genome.107 
                                                                                                     
 103. Belluck, supra note 93 (quoting Dr. Van den Veyver, who also voices 
concern “that if women stop [at NIPT], they miss the opportunity to have a 
diagnostic test like amnio that can detect other chromosomal abnormalities”). 
 104. See Megan Allyse & Christopher Thomas Scott, Too Much of a Good 
Thing, in Allison, supra note 8, at 598 (“[A] commercial model that encourages 
widespread distribution of such tests as NIPTs may emphasize clinical uptake 
over clinical utility.”); Minear et al., supra note 84, at 375 (commenting that the 
“pace of clinical translation has made it difficult for provider education to keep 
up,” and describing the problem of conveying reliable and accurate information to 
PPs as “virtually impossible”); Murdoch et al., supra note 96, at 14 (concluding 
that NIPT commercialization has polluted public and professional perception 
such that “fast adoption” has occurred without appropriate evidence of 
cost-efficacy and clinical utility). Contra Benn, supra note 100, at 551 (arguing 
that the lower positive predictive value of NIPT does not justify withholding it 
from women with low prior risk); Ken Song et al., Clinical Utility and Cost of 
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing with cfDNA Analysis in High-Risk Women Based 
on a US Population, 26 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 1180, 1183–84 
(2013) (finding NIPT superior in terms of accuracy and cost-effectiveness over 
first-trimester combined screening and integrated screening). 
 105. See Allison, supra note 8, at 596–97 (explaining that NIPTs are typically 
only offered to pregnant women with a “high risk of carrying a fetus with a defect,” 
whereas women with low risk of carrying a defective fetus receive traditional 
invasive screening tests). 
 106. See H. Christina Fan et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Measurement of the 
Fetal Genome, 487 NATURE 320, 320 (2012) (demonstrating that the prenatal 
genome can be determined non-invasively). 
 107. See id. (describing how a molecular counting method can be clinically 
applied to prenatal genome determination); Jacob O. Kitzman et al., Non-Invasive 
Whole Genome Sequencing of a Human Fetus, 137 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 
137ra76, 137ra81 (2012) (demonstrating non-invasive prediction of the 
whole-genome sequence of a human fetus); Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Maternal 
Plasma DNA Sequencing Reveals the Genome-Wide Genetic and Mutational 
Profile of the Fetus, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 61, 91 (2010) (constructing a 
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B. . . . And Whole-Genome Sequencing . . . 
The first generations of genetic sequencing technology focused 
only on pre-identified “variants of interest.” Genotyping, for 
example, returns small data sets on specific bases in the genome 
associated with recognized diseases.108 This type of single-gene 
testing is highly effective for confirming expressed symptoms, or 
for identifying suspected mutations early.109 Imagine you are 
trying to remember the exact phrasing of Pride and Prejudice’s 
infamous first sentence. Genotyping is like a card catalog—it is an 
effective tool for finding the sentence in the library, but only if you 
already know Pride and Prejudice is the book you are looking for. 
In medicine, card catalogs can be incredibly valuable. If a young 
male patient begins exhibiting symptoms like delay of motor 
milestones, muscle wasting, and abnormal levels of dystrophin in 
the blood, a genetic test targeting the DMD gene can help establish 
a diagnosis of Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD).110 Similarly, 
if PPs have a family history of DMD, genetic testing can determine 
if an individual is a carrier and, if so, the risk of passing on the 
genetic mutation.111 Importantly, in both cases, the physician must 
know that Duchenne causes symptoms like the patient’s and that 
the disease is associated with a DMD gene mutation.112 That is, in 
                                                                                                     
genome-wide genetic map of a fetus from maternal plasma DNA sequences and 
from information about the paternal genotype and maternal haplotype). 
 108. See Mark Wanner, Genomes Versus Exomes Versus Genotypes, JACKSON 
LABORATORY (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.jax.org/news-and-insights/jax-
blog/2016/september/genomes-versus-exomes-versus-genotypes (last visited Apr. 
16, 2019) (providing an overview of genotyping) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 109. See id. (“[G]enotyping focuses on specific bases in the genome known to 
vary from person to person.”). 
 110. See Learning About Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, NAT. HUM. GENOME 
RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/19518854/learning-about-duchenne-
muscular-dystrophy/#3 (last updated Apr. 18, 2013) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) 
(describing the symptoms of DMD) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 111. See id. (discussing how DMD is inherited). 
 112. See Wanner, supra note 108 (explaining that genotyping focuses on 
“certain locations in the genome where variations often occur”). 
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order to conduct effective genotyping, the physician must know in 
advance that the DMD gene is the target. 
Next-generation sequencing (NGS), however, is rapidly 
supplanting genotyping. If genotyping is the card catalog, NGS is 
the Google search. With this technology, a physician need not know 
in advance that the sentence is from Pride and Prejudice because 
NGS allows him to check every “book” in the library 
simultaneously.113 There are two distinct types of NGS. 
Whole-exome sequencing (WES) focuses on the known 
protein-coding regions of the genome (i.e., what we think of as 
genes), rather than on specific variants of interest.114 
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) focuses on both the coding and 
non-coding portions of the genome (i.e., all DNA).115 Though WES 
expands the frame of analysis measurably, it is but a stop on the 
way to WGS. WGS is the most comprehensive method of genetic 
analysis, allowing investigation of an individual’s entire genome.116 
However, comprehensiveness is not necessarily a good indicator of 
clinical utility.117 
                                                                                                     
 113. See Olwen Reina, A Beginner’s Guide to Next Generation Sequencing 
(NGS) Technology, BITE SIZE BIO, https://bitesizebio.com/21193/a-beginners-
guide-to-next-generation-sequencing-ngs-technology/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) 
(explaining that compared to genotyping, “NGS is characterized by improved 
accuracy and speed, but also reduced manpower and cost”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 114. See What Are Whole Exome Sequencing and Whole Genome Sequencing?, 
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/sequencing 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (describing how whole-exome sequencing works) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 115. See id. (describing how whole-genome sequencing works). 
 116. See id. (explaining that WGS can identify variations that WES would 
miss). WGS is distinguishable from a genome-wide association study (GWAS). 
GWAS involves rapid scans of an entire genome for variations associated with 
disease. However, like genotyping, GWAS only surveys an individual’s genome 
for strategically selected markers of variation (i.e., single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNP)). See Genome-Wide Association Studies, NAT. HUM. 
GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/20019523/genomewide-association-
studies-fact-sheet/ (last updated Aug. 27, 2015) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) 
(providing an overview of GWAS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 117. See What Are Whole Exome Sequencing and Whole Genome Sequencing, 
supra note 114 (explaining that although “many more genetic changes can be 
identified with whole-exome and whole-genome sequencing than with select gene 
sequencing, the significance of much of this information is unknown”). 
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Despite its comparatively narrow lens, WES is currently 
considered more clinically valuable than WGS.118 The reasons are 
both philosophic and economic.119 In providing a base-by-base view 
of the genome, WGS generates data of unparalleled breadth, 
depth, and volume.120 WGS thus differs in quantity and in kind 
from other types of genetic testing.121 On the one hand, it offers 
higher-yield returns by virtue of the simple fact that it returns 
more (and does so efficiently).122 
More information has the potential to expose disease-causing 
variants that would otherwise be missed and to therefore 
positively affect diagnosis rates.123 On the other hand, WGS 
returns indiscriminately. In addition to information about 
medically-severe, early-onset conditions (i.e., the same information 
available via genotyping and WES), WGS also generates vast 
amounts of information that may be clinically irrelevant, 
diagnostically ambiguous, or nonmedical.124 Perhaps most 
                                                                                                     
 118. See Janine Meienberg et al., Clinical Sequencing: Is WGS the Better 
WES?, 135 HUM. GENETICS 359, 359 (2016) (“Current clinical next-generation 
sequencing is done by using gene panels and exome analysis . . . .”); Wanner, supra 
note 108 (stating that “[m]any of the institutions to first offer clinical sequencing 
chose to focus on the coding regions only—the exome”). 
 119. See Meienberg et al., supra note 118, at 359 (discussing how WES “have 
been favored because of low sequencing costs, short turnaround time, and low rate 
of unspecific or incidental findings”). 
 120. See id. (explaining that WGS is “more likely than WES to provide 
complete coverage of the entire coding region of the genome”). 
 121. See Wanner, supra note 108 (explaining that whereas WES only 
sequences 1.5% of the human genome and does not sequence non-coding regions, 
WGS sequences the entire human genome including the non-coding regions). 
 122. See id. (discussing how WES only diagnoses roughly 30% of patients and 
WGS may improve diagnostic rates). 
 123. See Jamie M. Ellingford et al., Whole Genome Sequencing Increases 
Molecular Diagnostic Yield Compared with Current Diagnostic Testing for 
Inherited Retinal Disease, 123 OPTHALMOLOGY 1143, 1146 (2016) (finding that 
WGS could result in a 29% diagnostic increase for inherited retinal disease); 
Dimitri J. Stavropoulos et al., Whole-Genome Sequencing Expands Diagnostic 
Utility and Improves Clinical Management in Paediatric Medicine, 15012 NPJ 
GENOMIC MED. 1, 5 (2016) (finding that “WGS exceeds other technology platforms 
in ability to detect genetic variants involved in childhood disease”). 
 124. There are five categories of novel information implicated by WGS: 
“variants of unknown significance, nonmedical genetic markers, carrier status, 
susceptibility genes, and genes expressing conditions with late onset.” Greer 
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concerning, WGS provides unparalleled access to “variants of 
unknown significance” (VUS), the scientific term for nebulous 
genetic findings.125 Given the volume of results and levels of 
uncertainty attendant to them, many clinicians consider WGS an 
inelegant alternative to WES.126 
Indeed, in terms of philosophy, many clinicians subscribe to a 
theory of elegant medicine. Edmund Pellegrino articulated the 
theory as one of temperance, wherein clinicians “use only as many 
tests and treatments as necessary— just so much as to be able to 
understand what could be wrong, what could be done, and what 
ought to be done for the patient.”127 Pellegrino championed doing 
more with less, an ideal he styled variously as “diagnostic 
elegance” and “therapeutic parsimony.”128 For the elegant 
clinician, “reflex[ive] shotgunning in the face of uncertainty”129 is 
                                                                                                     
Donley et al., Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing: Just Because We Can, Should 
We?, 42 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 29 (2012). 
 125. See id. at 31 (“Because the health-related impact of VUS cannot be stated 
with any degree of certainty, the variants do not yet reveal any medically 
important information.”). 
 126. See Richard R. Sharp, Downsizing Genomic Medicine: Approaching the 
Ethical Complexity of Whole-Genome Sequencing by Starting Small, 13 GENETICS 
MED. 191, 191 (2011) (cautioning against clinical integration of WGS “before 
having established the knowledge base and clinical infrastructure required to 
support [it]”). But not all clinicians consider WGS less viable than the 
alternatives. For example, Howard Jacob, former Director of the Human and 
Molecular Genetics Center at the Medical College of Wisconsin, argues that “one 
simple test [referring to WGS] is a lot easier to figure out than doing each 
individual test.” Ryan Cross, Howard Jacob on Why Whole Genome Sequencing Is 
Best for Medicine, BIO-IT WORLD (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.bio-
itworld.com/2016/4/13/howard-jacob-why-whole-genome-sequencing-best-for-
medicine.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). That said, Jacob acknowledges that he and his research team are 
considered “cowboys and irresponsible for using a research-only tool” by the 
medical establishment. Id. 
 127. Daniel P. Sulmasy, Edmund Pellegrino’s Philosophy and Ethics of 
Medicine: An Overview, 24 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 105, 109–10 (2014). 
 128. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical 
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 27 (1986) (describing 
therapeutic parsimony and diagnostic elegance as ethical guidelines for the 
practice of competent medicine). 
 129. Howard Brody, Cost Containment as Professional Challenge, 8 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 5, 11 (1987) (discussing Pellegrino’s fundamental 
requirements for practicing ethical medicine). 
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intellectually sloppy.130 So-called shotgun medicine131 thus stands 
as the inverse of elegant medicine, with its “test everybody for 
everything”132 approach representative of everything wrong in 
modern medicine.133 At least until scientific understanding catches 
up with technological capability, WGS is something akin to the 
genetic testing equivalent of “everything but the kitchen sink.” 
In terms of economy, most of our scientific understanding is 
currently limited to Mendelian (single-gene) disorders.134 Though 
the exome only comprises between 1–2% of the human genome, 
approximately 85% of the nearly 4,000 Mendelian disorders with a 
known molecular basis are caused by gene mutations located in the 
exome.135 That said, more than 90% of the human exome, and 98% 
                                                                                                     
 130. See Joseph S. Alpert, Required Reading for Anyone Involved in Graduate 
Medical Education, 128 AM. J. MEDICINE 441, 441 (2015) (calling an “approach of 
obtaining every test possible, needed or not, the results of which would be sifted 
through later . . . too expensive, too wasteful, too invasive, and too intellectually 
sloppy”). 
 131. Pellegrino himself was more diplomatic in his assessments of shotgun 
medicine. He described it as but one of many styles of practice, and used the more 
flattering term “diagnostic enthusiasm, which leaves no test unused.” EDMUND D. 
PELLEGRINO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE REBORN: A PELLEGRINO READER 34 (H. 
Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Fabrice Jotterand eds., 2008). 
 132. Dan Shine, Rules for Shotgun Diagnosis, 128 AM. J. MED. e59, e59 (2015). 
 133. For a thoughtful and thorough consideration of the development of 
modern treatment models, see generally KENNETH M. LUDMERER, LET ME HEAL: 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESERVE EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 240–63 (2014) 
(discussing the evolution from the education-centered medical system of the 
pre-1980s to the economics-centered medical system of the current era and 
concluding that “the system [is] not designed to let [doctors] heal patients who 
require[] ‘slow medicine’”). 
 134. See What Are the Different Ways in Which a Genetic Condition Can Be 
Inherited?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/inheritance/inheritancepatterns (last visited Apr. 
16, 2019) (demonstrating a greater understanding of single-gene disorders 
compared to polygenic disorders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 135. See Murim Choi et al., Genetic Diagnosis by Whole Exome Capture and 
Massively Parallel DNA Sequencing, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 19,096, 
19,096 (2009) (describing the role that genetic mutations play in Mendelian 
disorders); Jessica X. Chong et al., The Genetic Basis of Mendelian Phenotypes: 
Discoveries, Challenges, and Opportunities, 97 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 199, 199 
(2015) (explaining that “2,937 genes underlying 4,163 Mendelian phenotypes 
have been discovered”). 
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of the genome, remain a question mark136— we do not know what 
most genetic findings from these regions mean, or whether they 
mean anything at all.137 Practically, this means that even when 
researchers limit the area of inquiry to the exome, upwards of 40% 
of patients with suspected Mendelian disorders are left with the 
diagnosis: We don’t know.138 Considering, then, the billions of ways 
that a genetic mutation might occur, it makes sense to focus on 
common “troublemaker genes.”139 Or at least it did when 
sequencing was costly. Until recently, sequencing a whole human 
genome was prohibitively expensive. In 2003, it cost $2.7 billion.140 
                                                                                                     
 136. See Donley et al., supra note 124, at 30 (explaining that “it will likely 
take decades to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the genome” (citing 
Amy L. McGuire & James R. Lupski, Personal Genome Research: What Should 
the Participant Be Told?, 26 TRENDS GENETICS 199, 200 (2010))). 
 137. For a long time, it was assumed that the genome’s non-coding regions 
lacked functionality. Francis Crick famously speculated that non-coding genes 
were “little better than junk.” Stephen S. Hall, Hidden Treasures in Junk DNA, 
SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hidden-
treasures-in-junk-dna/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). In 2012, Nature published a series of papers based on data 
gathered by the ENCODE project debunking the idea of “junk DNA.” For a 
fascinating discussion on the evolution of thought regarding junk DNA, and the 
scholarly debate the ENCODE project generated, see W. Ford Doolittle, Is Junk 
DNA Bunk? A Critique of ENCODE, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5294, 5294 
(2013) (recapping the debate ENCODE’s publications prompted and arguing that 
notwithstanding ENCORE’s findings, “junk” remains an apt descriptor “for much 
of our genome”). See also ENCODE Project Consortium, An Integrated 
Encyclopedia of DNA Elements in the Human Genome, 489 NATURE 57, 57 (2012) 
(assigning “biochemical functions for 80% of the genome”). 
 138. See Damian Smedley et al., A Whole-Genome Analysis Framework for 
Effective Identification of Pathogenic Regulatory Variants in Mendelian Disease, 
99 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 595, 604 (2016) (estimating that when WES is used, 
“only about 25–40% of individuals with suspected Mendelian disease . . . actually 
receive a diagnosis”); Wanner, supra note 108 (estimating that “exome sequencing 
still leaves ~70% of patients without diagnoses”). 
 139. Whereas whole-genome sequencing identifies previously unknown 
genes, traditional tests would only focus on the known “troublemaker genes” such 
as trisomies 13, 18, and 21. See Whole Genome Sequencing, GENETICS 
GENERATION, http://knowgenetics.org/whole-genome-sequencing/ (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing the advantages of WGS) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 140. See The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT. HUM. GENOME. RES. 
INST., https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-human-
genome/ (last updated July 6, 2016) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (detailing the price 
to develop the first human genome sequence) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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Since then, WGS’s price tag has plummeted to under $1,000141— a 
marked decrease that nonetheless remains above the costs of 
genotyping and WES. 
C. . . . To Prenatal Whole-Genome Sequencing 
NIPT and WGS are still transitioning into clinical care. 
Though there are those with philosophical reservations, cost is still 
a factor. For NIPT, cost-effective analyses weigh in favor of clinical 
adoption.142 There is also growing professional and consumer 
support for NIPT’s implementation as a routine first-tier screening 
method.143 For WGS, costs have fallen more than 99% in less than 
fifteen years.144 What once took thirteen years and billions of 
dollars now takes roughly three weeks.145 In January 2017, 
Illumina, the largest manufacturer of DNA sequencers, issued a 
press release promising that its latest product would “enable the 
$100 genome.”146 In subsequent interviews, Illumina’s CEO was 
more pragmatic. He admitted that the $100 genome was “more of 
a roadmap– something that would probably happen in more than 
three years and fewer than ten.”147 Either way, there is no denying 
that sequencing costs are plummeting. 
                                                                                                     
 141. See id. (listing the price for WGS in 2016). 
 142. See Song et al., supra note 104, at 1180 (“NIPT, at a base case price of 
$795, was more clinically effective and less costly (dominant) over both FTS [first 
trimester screening] and INT [integrated screening].”). 
 143. See Global NIPT Market to Exceed USD 2.5 Bn by 2025 Led by US, 
China, REUTERS (July 3, 2018, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/brandfeatures/venture-capital/article?id=41031 (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (discussing NIPT market growth) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 144. See The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, supra note 140 
(demonstrating the reduced cost to produce WGS).  
 145. See id. (discussing the logistics of producing WGS). 
 146. Illumina Introduces the NovaSeq Series—A New Architecture Designed 
to Usher in the $100 Genome, ILLUMINA (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://www.illumina.com/company/news-center/press-releases/press-release-
details.html?newsid=2236383 (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 147. Matthew Herper, Illumina Promises to Sequence Human Genome for 
$100—But Not Quite Yet, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2017, 5:30 PM), 
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Recent opinion pieces have described WGS as a challenge to 
long-considered “basic tenets of genetics,” such that “we are all 
mutants” now.148 Tom Shakespeare rather articulately observed 
that “whole genome sequencing reminds us that everyone is 
carrying deleterious mutations” and that “[i]n the postgenomic era, 
everyone is potentially disabled.”149 In a 2010 Lancet piece, Kelly 
Ormond et al. predicted that “an average person might need 
information about roughly 100 genetic risks discovered in their 
genome.”150 And as noted previously, there is a shortage of genetic 
counselors to provide that information.151 Of course, the difficult 
questions raised by genetic testing in general, and by WGS in 
particular, apply no less in the prenatal context. If we are all 
mutants now, what does that mean for our unborn children— and 
what, if anything, should we do with this information? 
The influx of genetic data, the inherent complexity and 
uncertainty associated with that data, and the difficulties in 
obtaining truly informed consent has created a perfect storm. 
Given the level of debate in academic and professional quarters, it 
is unsurprising that the storm has caught the attention of our 
political representatives. ABGA legislation is the clear result of 
that attention. The constitutionality of ABGAs has already been 
raised in the broader abortion debate and indeed, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is an obvious and appropriate lens through which to 
examine reason-based abortion bans. Scholars have done so at 
length.152 However, in the schema of our constitutional framework, 
                                                                                                     
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/01/09/illumina-promises-to-
sequence-human-genome-for-100-but-not-quite-yet/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. Carrie Arnold, ‘We Are All Mutants Now’: The Trouble with Genetic 
Testing, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2017, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jul/18/we-are-all-mutants-now-the-
trouble-with-genetic-testing (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. Tom Shakespeare, A Brave New World of Bespoke Babies?, 17 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 19, 19 (2017). 
 150. Kelly E. Ormond et al., Challenges in the Clinical Application of 
Whole-Genome Sequencing, 375 LANCET 1749, 1750 (2010). 
 151. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 152. See Donley, supra note 68, at 291 (examining the constitutionality of 
reason-based abortion bans in the WGS context at both the state and federal 
levels, under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment); Jaime S. King, Not This Child: Constitutional 
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the First Amendment is no less important than the Fourteenth 
and, in the context of laws like North Dakota’s, no less relevant. 
III. The Development of Free Speech 
Free speech protection is traditionally justified on intrinsic 
and instrumental grounds. 
That is, speech is adjudged either inherently valuable as a 
conduit for self-expression,153 or extrinsically valuable as a tool to 
                                                                                                     
Questions in Regulating Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective 
Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 2 (2012) (exploring 14th Amendment challenges to 
prenatal genetic testing technologies and reason-based abortion bans); Rachel 
Rebouché & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of Prenatal 
Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L.J. 983, 986 (2012) (arguing that “current 
law and practice put genetic testing and abortion on a collision course”); John A. 
Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early 
Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 373–79 (2011) (speculating about 
the likely reaction of anti-abortion groups to prenatal sequencing and considering 
whether states can constitutionally restrict abortion or limit testing); Samantha 
von Ende, Note, SEQUELA: Casey, Gonzales, and State Legislatures’ 
Unscrupulous Use of Science in Crafting Legislation to Regulate Pregnant Women 
and Women’s Access to Reproductive Health Care, 4 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 21, 
49 (2016) (focusing on states’ “unscrupulous use” of advancements in reproductive 
technologies to restrict abortion rights). 
 153. Seana Valentine Shiffrin argues against conceptualizing free speech as 
instrumentally valuable. Rather, “[s]peech, and free speech in particular, 
are . . . the only precise avenues by which one can be known as the individual one 
is by others.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of 
Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 291 (2011). For Shiffrin, free speech facilitates 
the transmission of one’s thoughts and beliefs to others—a critical function “[i]f 
what makes one a distinctive individual qua person is largely a matter of the 
contents of one’s mind . . . .” Id. Shiffrin’s argument assumes that “[b]eing known 
by others . . . is important in itself.” Id. at 292. Edwin Baker’s liberty theory of 
the First Amendment also emphasizes inherent value, albeit on different grounds 
than Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach. See Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, First 
Amendment Theories and Press Responsibility: The Work of Zechariah Chafee, 
Thomas Emerson, Vincent Blasi and Edwin Baker, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 48, 59 (1992) 
(describing Baker’s theory as protective of “the speaker in the act of speaking,” 
“whether or not intended to communicate propositions or attitudes to others”). 
See also C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First 
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 298 (1982) (noting that instrumental theories 
suggest First Amendment protection would extend to “effective speech” but not to 
communicative or symbolic speech); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 153 (1989) (discussing justification for free speech on 
dignity and equality grounds in that “suppression represents a kind of contempt 
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accomplish something else (though there is disagreement about 
what that something else may be).154 Whatever the theoretical 
underpinnings of these value assessments, however, it is clear that 
not all speech is valuable. Speech that incites unlawful or violent 
conduct, for example, receives very minimal protection under the 
First Amendment.155 The same is true for libel,156 child 
                                                                                                     
for citizens that is objectionable independent of its consequences”); Martin H. 
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 595 (1982) (arguing 
against determining constitutional protection on the basis of types of speech 
because “all forms of expression are equally valuable for constitutional 
purposes”); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U.L. 
REV. 237, 241 (1978) (arguing for the analytic strength of intrinsic over 
instrumental claims because though controversial, “only forthright claims of 
intrinsic value . . . can avoid the endless chase of means after ends”). 
 154. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (suggesting 
that the First Amendment’s “urgent” value lies in ensuring appropriate political 
campaign conduct); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) 
(recognizing free speech as necessary to prevent “occasional tyrannies” and 
promote self-governance); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (establishing the canonical “marketplace of ideas” 
metaphor wherein free speech is instrumentally valuable as a catalyst for the 
discovery of truth); ALEXANDER MEIKLE JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF GOVERNMENT 29 (3d ed. 2004) (proposing free speech protection as 
instrumentally directed at preserving “the program of self-government”); Vincent 
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND RES. 
J. 521, 527–28 (1977) (articulating an instrumental value for free speech in 
checking the abuse of power by public officials and calling it “the checking value”). 
 155. This type of speech is also called “Brandenburg incitement” in reference 
to the landmark case of the same name. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969). The Brandenburg test represents the strongest free speech 
protection ever recognized by the Court and the current governing law in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
 156. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (calling libel 
“of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the societal interest in order and morality”). 
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pornography,157 obscenity,158 “fighting words,”159 and true 
threats.160 It is also clear that not all valuable speech is equally 
valuable. For instance, commercial speech is considered less 
valuable than core speech and therefore enjoys limited First 
Amendment protection.161 By contrast, political speech and press 
publications, the paradigmatic examples of high-value core speech, 
receive the fullest constitutional protection.162 The question of 
value thus has more than just descriptive significance; value 
assignments prescribe levels of constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                                                                     
 157. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (recognizing and 
classifying child pornography as a category outside the protection of the First 
Amendment). 
 158. The Supreme Court has consistently held that obscenity— i.e., hardcore 
sexual materials (distinguishable from the broader category of pornography)— is 
not protected, except with respect to private possession in the home. See Paris 
Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (concluding that legislatures may 
ban commercialized obscenity based on its “tendency to exert a corrupting and 
debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has 
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or films he may watch.”). 
 159. Chaplinsky defined fighting words as “those by which their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) 
(adopting a “directed use” requirement for distinguishing fighting words from 
merely offensive speech). 
 160. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“‘True threats’ [are] those 
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”).  
 161. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (concluding that commercial speech is not valueless but 
is different enough from other forms of speech such that “a different [i.e., lesser] 
degree of protection is necessary”). 
 162. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (acknowledging the 
“Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate 
in political affairs”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) 
(placing political speech “on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296 (1964) (explaining that the First Amendment “at the 
very least . . . leaves the people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss 
public affairs with impunity”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
(describing the phrasing of the First Amendment as designed “to assure 
unfettered interchange” of political and social ideas). 
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A. Legitimate, Important, and Compelling: The Levels of Judicial 
Scrutiny 
In the earliest part of the twentieth century, judicial review 
came in just two flavors: rational basis and strict scrutiny. Both 
were, and are, generally understood to be outcome-determinative. 
Low-value speech triggers rational basis review. Built on a bedrock 
of judicial minimalism, rational basis analyses begin with a strong 
presumption of constitutional validity.163 When confronted with a 
categorical prohibition on obscenity164 or child pornography,165 for 
instance, the Supreme Court asks only: Is the restriction rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest?166 By the Court’s own 
articulation, rational basis sets a low bar. It accepts as valid “any 
conceivable basis” for a claimed state interest, even if offered post 
hoc;167 even if “not . . . in every respect logically consistent”;168 even 
if “unwise [or] improvident”;169 even if imperfect in operation.170 At 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A 
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1775 
(2004) (calling rational basis review so “stunningly minimal” that it allows 
“regulatory schemes based on highly dubious justification”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (1996) (stating that 
“‘rational basis’ review is rooted in a presumption of good faith, rebutted only in 
rare instances”). 
 164. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60–63 (1973) 
(upholding state regulation of adult films in public theaters even lacking 
“conclusive proof”); Schauer, supra note 163, at 1775 (noting that the Supreme 
Court has failed to subject obscenity regulations “to anything more than rational 
basis review”). 
 165. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753, 758 (1982) (applying 
rational basis review and finding that a State has “somewhat more freedom in 
proscribing works which portray sexual or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by 
children”). 
 166. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 
VA. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (“Through the ‘rational basis’ test, the Supreme Court 
asserts the authority to assess whether laws are ‘rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.’”).  
 167. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (noting also that “it is 
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for 
the challenged [law] actually motivated the legislature”). See also Russell W. 
Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 898–99 (1991) 
(describing rationality review as requiring only “any conceivable valid 
government interest”). 
 168. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
 169. Id. at 488. 
 170. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 541–42 (1961) (eschewing the 
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the other end of the spectrum, high-value core speech triggers 
strict scrutiny. 
Strict scrutiny swaps “rationally related” for “narrowly 
tailored” and “legitimate” for “compelling.”171 The question thus 
becomes: Is the restriction narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest?172 Where rational basis review assumes 
legislative good faith, strict scrutiny analyses begin with strong 
skepticism. In terms of a speech restriction’s chance of surviving a 
legal objection, strict scrutiny is the legal equivalent of sinking a 
basket from half-court.173 
Beginning in the 1940s, hairline fractures began appearing in 
the glossy veneer of the two-tiered system of judicial review. Some 
cases seemed to call for “more exacting judicial scrutiny” than 
rational basis allows.174 In those cases, the Supreme Court was at 
the same time hesitant to treat the claimed state interest as a 
foregone issue. For example, in Kovacs v. Cooper,175 the city of 
Trenton, New Jersey banned the use of sound trucks (i.e., motor 
                                                                                                     
idea that a legislature be required to “hew the line of logical exactness” under the 
rational basis standard). 
 171. For examples of strict scrutiny applications, see United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (striking down a statute banning depictions of 
animal cruelty for insufficient narrow tailoring); United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (failing to find a compelling government interest 
and narrow tailoring for content-based regulations under the 1996 
Telecommunications Act); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 
235– 37 (1995) (articulating and applying the strict scrutiny test to racial 
classifications). 
 172. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 n.14 (2010) (“Strict 
scrutiny asks whether the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.” (quoting Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 813)). 
 173. In 1972, Stanford Law professor Gerald Gunther described strict 
scrutiny under the Warren Court as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerard 
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48 (1972). The phrase has since 
become a “pithy and influential slogan” for a predetermined result. Matthew D. 
Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict 
Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 349 (2011). In 
core speech cases, strict scrutiny means “the speaker [will] triumph, and the 
government’s case (and frequently the statute on which it [is] based) [will] go 
down in flames.” Id. at 351. 
 174. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 175. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT 609 
vehicles affixed with a loudspeaker) on public streets.176 The 
appellant was arrested by a city patrolman for parking his truck 
near a municipal building and using a sound truck to broadcast 
political commentary about an ongoing Trenton labor dispute.177 
The appellant’s commentary, decidedly not low-value speech, 
should have triggered strict scrutiny. And of course, challenged 
laws should not survive strict scrutiny. The analysis should have 
been straightforward, the outcome predetermined.178 And yet, even 
if Trenton could not demonstrate an interest which would 
traditionally qualify as compelling— e.g., public health and safety, 
national security, and the like179— the Court nonetheless felt that 
the city’s interest in protecting residents “from the distracting 
noises of vehicles equipped with such sound amplifying devices” 
was important.180 To hold otherwise would violate “the quiet and 
tranquility so desirable for city dwellers.”181 Indeed, it would put 
them “at the mercy of advocates of particular religious, social or 
political persuasions.”182 The Court was unwilling to profoundly 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. at 78 (prohibiting “any device known as a sound truck, loud 
speaker, or amplifiers . . . which emits therefrom loud and raucous 
noises . . . upon any vehicle operated or standing upon said streets or public 
places aforementioned”).  
 177. Id. at 79 (recounting the record of the police officer’s testimony whereby 
the Trenton officer heard the appellant broadcasting his voice in what the lower 
court believed was a commentary on the labor dispute progress). 
 178. See supra Bunker, note 173 at 349 (describing strict scrutiny as a “pithy 
and influential slogan” for a predetermined result). 
 179. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (expanding 
Gitlow’s list of compelling interest to include preventing “endanger[ment] of the 
foundations of organized government”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 
(1926) (finding that the interests in preventing corruption of public morals, 
incitements to crime, and disturbances of the peace are sufficiently compelling to 
justify speech restrictions); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 
(1905) (concluding that the state’s interest in protecting public health and public 
safety is sufficiently compelling to justify compulsory vaccination). Though not a 
speech case, Jacobson is relevant in that it emphasized that core constitutional 
rights have never been without limitation. Under our system of government, a 
citizen: “may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard 
to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political 
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the 
chance of being shot down in its defense.” Id. at 29. 
 180. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949). 
 181. Id. at 87. 
 182. Id. 
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handicap the government’s ability to secure the peace.183 Thus, in 
Kovacs and thereafter, the Supreme Court adopted a new 
methodology.184 By the late 1980s, that methodology had coalesced 
under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny,” a nebulous grey area 
that now occupies the middle of the spectrum between rational 
basis and strict scrutiny.185 
Today, speech that is neither low-value nor high-value 
triggers intermediate scrutiny. Though it has multiple 
formulations,186 intermediate scrutiny refers to a “middle-tier” 
                                                                                                     
 183. Cf. id. at 88 (“To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of 
others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.”). 
 184. In truth, the new methodology existed for several decades as a set of 
disparate speech-specific tests. For a thorough discussion of each test, see 
generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny 
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785–800. 
 185. The development of intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment law has 
garnered mixed reviews. According to some scholars, rational basis was “an 
acceptable starting point,” but forcing a two-tiered system to accommodate the 
nuances of the First Amendment “sacrifice[d] much-needed subtleties for 
doctrinal simplicity.” Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 785–86. Accord Neel U. 
Sukhatme, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech 
and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2836 (2005) (noting that “not all 
speech fits neatly within this dichotomy”). Bhagwat argues that even three tiers 
is not enough. See id. at 831 (arguing for disaggregation as the doctrinal solution 
to the problem of intermediate scrutiny). Other scholars argue that it is not the 
two-tiered system that is deficient but rather the judicial tendency to circumvent 
it. By this view, intermediate scrutiny is one of the ways in which “courts manage 
to avoid the application of strict scrutiny.” Bunker et al., supra note 173, at 352. 
 186. The Supreme Court does not consistently use the same language in its 
application of intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989) (combining “narrowly tailored” with “legitimate interest” 
to form intermediate hybrid analysis); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (requiring a “substantial” government 
interest and a means of advancing it that is “not more extensive than necessary”); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–29 (1976) (describing the standard of review as 
a “rigorous” weighing of the competing interests and applying something less 
than strict scrutiny); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) 
(stating that “the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; 
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong”—and settling on 
“important or substantial”); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (calling 
for a “weigh[ing of] the circumstances” and an appraisal of “the substantiality of 
the reasons advanced” by the government). The Supreme Court has itself 
acknowledged inconsistency in this area. See Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1996) (calling it “close scrutiny” 
and declaring it “unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one 
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approach that requires a “sharper focus” than “the relatively 
deferential ‘rational basis’ standard.”187 The question is: Does the 
speech restriction advance a “significant/substantial/important” 
government interest via reasonable means?188 But unlike in 
rational basis and strict scrutiny analyses, the Court’s asking of 
the question under intermediate scrutiny is not perfunctory. 
Whether the answer is “yes” or “no” is not predetermined. Rather, 
“the track record of outcomes is mixed” and “[i]nstead of winning 
always or never, the government may sometimes win or sometimes 
lose—it all depends.”189 For the purposes of this Article, it is 
perhaps enough to understand that intermediate scrutiny is a 
vague balancing technique that applies to medium-value speech. 
B. The Doctrinal Development of Professional Speech 
                                                                                                     
specific set of words”). 
 187. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Bhagwat and others have concluded that “despite somewhat differing 
formulations, many of the Court’s new ‘tests’ share some basic, common 
characteristics.” Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 801. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Post-Liberal Judging: The Role of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 293, 297 (1992) (stating that all the many formulations of intermediate 
scrutiny ultimately require laws to “meet the same mid-level hurdle”). 
 188. Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 801. Jay D. Wexler’s definition of 
intermediate scrutiny is also clarifying: “a test that requires a state interest which 
is greater than legitimate but less than compelling and a fit between means and 
end that is not necessarily narrowly tailored but has more than just an incidental 
connection.” Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as 
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 300 n.15 (1998). 
 189. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 297–98. 
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The category of medium-value speech is expansive. 
Expressive/symbolic conduct,190 mass media communications,191 
and commercial speech192 all trigger intermediate scrutiny. The 
standard also applies—regardless of the type of speech 
involved— to time, place, and manner restrictions193 (and 
                                                                                                     
 190. Nude dancing is an example of expressive conduct falling “within the 
outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.” See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 
529 U.S. 277, 290, 296 (2000) (distinguishing between laws that target nudity 
containing an erotic message—i.e., erotic dancing—and laws that target all public 
nudity and applying O’Brien to the latter); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 405–06 (1989) (holding that desecration of the American flag by burning 
qualifies as expressive conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (concluding that “the wearing of an armband for the purpose 
of expressing certain views . . . was . . . closely akin to ‘pure speech’”); Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–43 (1966) (reiterating that free speech rights “are 
not confined to verbal expression” and concluding that a peaceful sit-in to protest 
racial segregation qualifies as expressive conduct). 
 191. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–48 (1978) (stating 
that “of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most 
limited First Amendment protection” and declining to apply strict scrutiny to a 
content restriction on speech that would be protected in other contexts); Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386, 390 (1969) (weighing the rights of viewers 
and listeners against the rights of broadcasters and concluding that “differences 
in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment 
standards applied to them”). 
 192. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 485–86 (1996) 
(determining that a ban on commercial speech that is neither false nor misleading 
“does not satisfy even the less than strict standard that generally applies in 
commercial speech cases under Central Hudson”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (establishing 
definitively that commercial speech receives lesser protection than core speech, 
requiring an analysis that “turns on the nature both of the expression and of the 
governmental interests served by its regulation”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761, 771 (1976) (stating that 
“speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to 
project it” and weighing the respective societal and government interests in the 
free flow of commercial information). 
 193. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534–41 (2014) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny after concluding that a Massachusetts buffer zone law was 
a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 719 (2000) (identifying Colorado’s buffer zone law as a time, place, manner 
regulation and applying Ward); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 
(1989) (stating that time, place, manner regulations “must be narrowly tailored to 
serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not 
be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so”). 
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injunctions)194 on speech, as well as to legislative attempts to 
mitigate secondary effects of speech.195 Intermediate scrutiny 
undoubtedly applies to a broader swath of speech than either 
rational basis or strict scrutiny. In a characteristically animated 
dissent in 1994, the late Justice Antonin Scalia chided the Court 
for its assumption that intermediate scrutiny constitutes “some 
kind of default standard.”196 The context in that case was a 
speech-free buffer zone around a Florida abortion clinic,197 but 
Scalia’s sentiment was correct in a broader sense— intermediate 
scrutiny has become a multi-purpose staple of First Amendment 
jurisprudence.198 Indeed, it seems intermediate scrutiny 
increasingly applies to any speech not readily categorizable. 
Professional speech is a particularly glaring example of “not 
readily categorizable” speech. In 1999, Robert Post provided a 
succinct definition of the type of professional speech to which I am 
referring: “speech uttered in the course of professional practice as 
distinct from speech uttered by a professional.”199 At various 
points, I refer to speech of the latter type— i.e., speech uttered by 
a professional—as “context-divorced speech.” If a physician 
comments as a private citizen on an issue of public interest, then 
that physician is engaging in context-divorced speech. 
                                                                                                     
 194. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (“[W]hen 
evaluating a content-neutral injunction . . . the challenged provisions of the 
injunction [must] burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant 
government interest.”). 
 195. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1986) (noting that a 
time, place, manner restriction on adult film theaters may be justified if the 
restriction is directed “at the secondary effects of such theaters on the 
surrounding community”). 
 196. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 792 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. at 757–60 (describing the factual background of the case including 
the order prohibiting petitioners from engaging in certain activities). 
 198. See Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 784 (noting that strict scrutiny is limited 
to content-based speech regulations and rational basis is “rarely invoked”); see 
also Sullivan, supra note 187, at 297 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is 
applied whenever “[a] set of cases comes along that just can’t be steered readily 
onto the strict scrutiny or rationality track”); Wexler, supra note 188, at 300 
(“Intermediate scrutiny is one of the Court’s most frequently employed balancing 
techniques.”). 
 199. Robert C. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment 
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (2007) 
(quoting Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the 
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834 (1999)). 
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However, that a practical definition of professional speech can 
be articulated is far from conclusive.200 In the legal sense, it is 
unclear whether there is such a thing as professional speech at 
all.201 Certainly the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized 
it.202 Notably, the Court has taken pains to demarcate discernible 
lines between other categories of speech. 
Obscenity does not include graphic violence;203 sexually 
explicit material is not by definition obscenity;204 pornography is 
                                                                                                     
 200. It is worth noting that there are many professionals who might qualify 
as “professional speakers.” However, the Court’s professional speech doctrine is 
not any clearer with respect to one profession over another. See generally, Agency 
for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (NGOs); Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (professional advocacy services); 
Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010) (bankruptcy attorneys); Legal 
Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (public interest lawyers); Gentile 
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (lawyers); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the 
Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (professional fundraisers). Given the subject matter of 
this Article, I have chosen to focus exclusively on physician speech qua 
professional speech. 
 201. See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 
1258 (2016) (stating that “the Supreme Court has never identified a category of 
‘professional speech’ for First Amendment purposes”); Jennifer M. Keighley, 
Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit 
on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2353 (2013) 
(describing professional speech rights as doctrinally “unclear and opaque”); Post, 
supra note 130, at 944 (noting that the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue 
and “[s]cholars have taken widely different views about the constitutional status 
of physicians’ speech”); Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1289, 1293 (2015) (“[I]t is unclear whether there is a category of “professional 
speech” that is subject to minimal or no First Amendment scrutiny.”); Jacob M. 
Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California 
Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532, 
1554– 55 (2014) (exploring the blurry “line between speech that is incidental to 
professional conduct and protected speech”). 
 202. The Supreme Court has at least not addressed professional speech as a 
separate and distinct category from commercial speech or regulable professional 
conduct. Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, slip 
op. at 8 (2018) (“But this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a 
separate category of speech.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Assn., 564 U.S. 786, 793 (2011) 
(rejecting “a State’s attempt to shoehorn speech about violence into obscenity” and 
concluding that “speech about violence is not obscene”). 
 204. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (finding that the 
film at issue showed “in a broader sense, sex . . . including [scenes wherein] 
‘ultimate sexual acts’ [are] . . . taking place” but concluding it did not qualify as 
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legally differentiable from child pornography;205 “fighting words” 
and “true threats” are separate categories of speech.206 Indeed, as 
a general matter, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is 
fairly nuanced. And yet to the extent that the Court has considered 
professional speech at all, it has until recently only done so 
tangentially. The abortion cases illustrate the most obvious 
examples of this phenomenon. 
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
In 1992, the Supreme Court granted a re-assessment of many 
of the constitutional questions first raised in Roe v. Wade.207 In 
doing so, the Court provided arguably the most defensible 
statement for professional speech as a protected category for the 
ensuing twenty-six years. Ironically, it did so using language of 
such ambiguity that commentators have described the passage as 
“cryptic,”208 “puzzling,”209 and “limited.”210 At least one 
commentator speculated that the Court did not intend to 
meaningfully address professional speech at all.211 Rather, the 
Court “simply blundered” in referencing the First Amendment in 
a due process analysis.212 
                                                                                                     
legally obscene). 
 205. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (finding the Miller 
standard for obscenity an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of child 
pornography). 
 206. Though true threats are unprotected under the same rationale as 
fighting words, the two categories are recognized as separate. Compare 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words), 
with Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (defining true threats). 
 207. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 208. Haupt, supra note 201, at 1259. 
 209. Post, supra note 199, at 946. 
 210. Keighley, supra note 201, at 2356. 
 211. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional 
Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 38 
(2016) (hypothesizing that other commentators missed the mark in their theories 
and that the Court did not intend to directly address professional speech and that 
it was incidental in their decision in Casey). 
 212. Id. 
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At issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey213 were five provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control 
Act.214 Much of the content outlined in the provisions mirrored 
content the Court had found objectionable in earlier cases.215 
Pennsylvania’s Act structured abortion discussions under the 
auspices of informed consent. Physicians in Pennsylvania, as in the 
earlier cases, were required to advise pregnant women of the 
medical risks involved; the availability of medical assistance 
benefits for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care; and the 
availability of public and private agencies to provide assistance 
                                                                                                     
 213. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 214.  See id. at 844 (“At issue in these cases are five provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989.”). 
 215. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
444–45 (1983) (concluding disclosures were medically inappropriate suggesting 
abortion was a dangerous procedure). Akron, Ohio’s city ordinance required 
physicians to orally inform women seeking abortions that “abortion is a major 
surgical procedure” with physical and psychological complications. Id. at 445. The 
ordinance also mandated a verbal and detailed description of “the anatomical and 
physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child,” accompanied by the 
statement that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception.” 
Id. at 444. The Court concluded that the required disclosures were not only 
medically inappropriate, requiring “at best speculation by the physician,” but 
further constituted “‘a parade of horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a 
particularly dangerous procedure.” Id. at 444–45; see also Thornburg v. Am. Coll. 
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764 (1986) (determining the 
statute’s informational requirements were facially unconstitutional). At issue in 
Thornburg were provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act prescribing 
the elements of informed consent to abortion. The Court held that the required 
disclosures—which mandated a physician-delivered description of fetal 
characteristics; presentation of a list of agencies available to provide prenatal, 
childbirth, and neonatal care; and a statement that the father is liable for child 
support—were nonmedical, irrelevant, and inappropriate. Id. at 762–63. The 
Court concluded:  
Forcing the physician or counselor to present the materials and the list 
to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the State in 
treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur upon both the 
materials and the list. All this is, or comes close to being, state medicine 
imposed upon the woman, not the professional medical guidance she 
seeks, and it officially structures—as it obviously was intended to 
do— the dialogue between the woman and her physician.  
Id. at 763 (internal citations omitted). The Court found the informational 
requirements facially unconstitutional. Id. at 764. 
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during and after pregnancy.216 As in earlier cases, Pennsylvania 
mandated a 24-hour waiting period between the patient’s giving of 
informed consent and performance of the abortion.217 And, finally, 
again as in earlier cases, the Pennsylvanian legislators mandated 
a statement advising pregnant women of the biological father’s 
liability.218 
Aside from an earlier Title X case, which was limited by its 
facts to contexts involving federal funding,219 the First Amendment 
had yet to merit independent consideration in the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence. In Casey, the Court granted it that independent 
consideration— in all of two sentences. “To be sure,” the Court 
stated in a joint opinion signed by only three Justices, “the 
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, 
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State.”220 We see no constitutional 
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the 
information mandated by the State here.”221 Without directly 
overturning any of its earlier case law, the Court nonetheless 
                                                                                                     
 216. Compare Regulation of Abortions, Akron Codified Ordinances, ch. 1870, 
§ 1870.06, Ordinance No. 160-1978, invalidated by Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) 
(requiring attending physicians make specified statements to assure a truly 
informed consent), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1982) (providing a 
comprehensive list of required disclosures for doctors performing abortions with 
criminal penalties for violation). 
 217. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1) (listing a disclosure requirement 
twenty-four hours prior to the planned abortion). 
 218. Id. § 3205(2)(iii) (1989). The Thornburgh court took issue with the 
liability provision in 1986. Justice Blackmun observed that in some cases a 
liability reminder might have a destructive effect on the doctor–patient 
relationship. The Court determined, “a victim of rape should not have to hear 
gratuitous advice that an unidentified perpetrator is liable for her 
support . . . [u]nder the guise of informed consent.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763. 
In the amended provision at issue in Casey, the legislature exempted physicians 
from issuing a liability advisory in cases of rape. Section 3205(2)(iii) (“The father 
of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her child, even in instances 
where he has offered to pay for the abortion. In the case of rape, this information 
may be omitted.”). 
 219. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202 (1991). 
 220. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 221. Id. 
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“overrule[d] those parts of [earlier case law]” deemed inconsistent 
with the State’s legitimate interest in protecting potential life.222 
Since Casey, legal scholars—and more notably, lower court 
judges—have spilled significant ink speculating, arguing, and 
ultimately disagreeing about its First Amendment import.223 
Whatever level of importance the Court meant to ascribe to 
professional speech with those two “on-the-fly” sentences,224 most 
commentators agree that the intention was clearly not to provide 
a coherent framework for assessing future First Amendment 
claims.225 Thus, the Court’s decision in 2017 to grant certiorari in 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra226 was 
potentially momentous. For the first time since Casey, the question 
of physicians’ free speech rights was again under Supreme Court 
scrutiny, and in the abortion context no less. 
                                                                                                     
 222. Id. at 870. Note that even absent explicit overturn, Akron and 
Thornburgh were not good law after Casey. See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2384 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“These 
cases [Akron and Thornburgh], however . . . are no longer good law [after 
Casey].”). 
 223. See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 201, at 1246 (“There may be less desire to 
protect professional speech concerned with abortion— and more tolerance for 
government demands to read inaccurate, legislatively drafted scripts, compelled 
descriptions of mandatory ultrasounds and the like— based on moral disproval.”); 
Sawicki, supra note 211, at 14 (addressing the lower court difficulty of 
interpreting the precedent set by Casey with regard to constitutional standards 
for reviewing state regulations of physician speech); Jennifer M. Keighley, supra 
note 201, at 2348 (questioning the First Amendment implications of the compelled 
speech mandated by state laws after the decision in Casey specifically in the 
context of ultrasound procedures); Lindsey Schmidt, Note, The Constitutional 
Right to an Abortion Does Not Encompass the Right to Be Uninformed: The Fourth 
Circuit’s Puzzling Approach to Evaluating Mandatory Ultrasound Provisions in 
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), 95 NEB. L. REV. 1124, 1156–57 
(2017) (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions related to a North Carolina 
law and addressing the potential flaws with the decision in light of precedent in 
Casey). 
 224. Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. 
VA. L. REV. 67, 81 (2016). 
 225.  See id. (discussing a previous scholar’s work and how that work did not 
go far enough to state that Casey provided “virtually no guidance as to the general 
constitutional status of professional speech”). 
 226. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
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2. National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra 
The specific question under consideration in Becerra was: “Do 
disclosures required by a California reproductive rights law violate 
protections arising from the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment?”227 The law in question, California’s Reproductive 
FACT (Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and 
Transparency) Act had two core provisions. The first required 
licensed clinics228 in California to tell pregnant women (via posted 
or printed notice in no less than 22- or 14-point type, respectively) 
that the State provides free or low-cost access to family planning 
services, including abortion.229 The second provision required 
unlicensed clinics to post a notice disclosing their unlicensed status 
and to include in all their advertisements the same disclosure.230 
Per the Act, the notice included in advertisements needed to be “in 
the same size or larger font than the surrounding text.”231 
In their court briefs, Petitioners, two pro-life crisis pregnancy 
centers— one licensed and the other unlicensed— argued that the 
Reproductive FACT Act violated the First Amendment. More 
specifically, the licensed clinic argued that compelling them to 
distribute a government-drafted script advertising abortion— i.e., 
“the very practice that petitioners are devoted to opposing”—“at 
the same time petitioners [are trying] to dissuade women from 
choosing that option” effectively transformed them into the State’s 
mouthpiece.232 The unlicensed clinic argued in a similar vein. 
                                                                                                     
 227. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 228. The FACT Act defined such clinics as those providing obstetric 
ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms, prenatal care, contraception counseling, 
pregnancy testing and diagnosis, prenatal sonography, or abortion services. See 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a)(1)–(6) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 
2019 Reg. Sess.) (defining licensed covered facilities as those providing two or 
more of the listed services). 
 229. See id. § 123472(a)(2)(A) (“A public notice posted in a conspicuous place 
where individuals wait that may be easily read by those seeking services from the 
facility. The notice shall be at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches and written in no less 
than 22-point type.”). 
 230. Id. § 123472(b)(3)  
 231. Id. 
 232. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 
(2018). 
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Under the Act’s definition, a facility that advertised the 
availability of free resources to encourage childbirth (e.g., prenatal 
vitamins, diapers, baby clothes), would count as an “unlicensed 
clinic.” Thus, such a facility’s two-word advertisement—FREE 
DIAPERS— would need to be accompanied by a twenty-nine-word 
disclosure, in thirteen languages, with the same size font.233 
Petitioners argued that “[w]hile the centers exist to support 
childbirth, the Act forces them to point the way to ending unborn 
babies’ lives.”234 
With respect to licensed clinics, California’s reply brief leaned 
heavily on an argument that had been gaining traction in many of 
the lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit.235 Namely, that 
notices of the type required by the FACT Act did not count as 
self-expression.236 Respondents argued that notifying patients that 
abortions are available as an option from other providers did not 
amount to either an endorsement or a referral.237 Indeed, the State 
noted that “although California’s law leaves clinics entirely free to 
expressly disavow the notice, no ‘disavowal’ should be necessary, 
because the required notice does not suggest any ‘avowal’ in the 
first place.”238 With respect to unlicensed clinics, Respondents 
argued that the disclosure served to protect pregnant women from 
mistaking unlicensed clinics for medical providers and was, like 
the disclosure for licensed clinics, neutral and non-directive.239 
                                                                                                     
 233. “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California 
and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the 
provision of services.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(b) (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 4 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 234. Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140), 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 63, 
at *11. 
 235. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 236. See Brief for the State Respondents at 43, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140), 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 650, at *75 (“Patients understand that a clinic’s role in serving as a conduit 
for such notices is not self-expression.”) (citation omitted). 
 237. See id. at 38 (noting that the Court is wary of government attempts to 
compel endorsement). 
 238. Id. at 43–44 (citations omitted). 
 239. See id. at 21–22 (discussing unlicensed facilities whose activities include 
“obstetric ultrasounds,” “prenatal care,” “pregnancy testing or diagnosis,” and 
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In the nearly three decades since Casey was handed down, the 
Supreme Court had said little about professional speech.240 With 
respect to context-divorced speech, however, the Court’s 
jurisprudence was considerably better developed. Several opinions 
had addressed context-divorced speech in the realm of commercial 
advertising,241 which prompted some lower courts to apply the 
commercial speech case law to evaluate professional speech 
claims,242 albeit controversially.243 Other courts interpreted Casey 
as both identifying a distinct category of speech (i.e., professional) 
and ascribing to it a lower, rational basis level value.244 And still 
other courts subscribed to the opposite conclusion and accordingly 
applied heightened— even strict— scrutiny in professional speech 
cases.245 Given the absence of guiding doctrine from the High 
Court, the lower courts, by necessity, actively developed their own, 
often divergent, lines of professional speech jurisprudence.246 
                                                                                                     
“collect[ing] health information from clients” (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 123471(b) (West 2015)). 
 240. See Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 
388 (2018) (describing Becerra and Casey as key precedents in the context of 
compelled speech). 
 241. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (considering 
First Amendment protection for pharmaceutical marketers and data miners); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 629 
(1985) (considering attorneys’ free speech rights with respect to soliciting 
business via advertising); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976) (considering professional pharmacists’ free 
speech rights in the context of price advertising for prescription drugs). 
 242. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We 
believe that commercial and professional speech share important qualities and, 
thus, that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for 
prohibitions aimed at either category.”). 
 243. See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1264 
(2016) (arguing that courts are mistaken in analogizing professional speech and 
commercial speech because the underlying speech interests are fundamentally 
different). 
 244. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying 
rational basis after determining that a law’s effect on free speech interests was 
merely incidental). 
 245. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1246 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen speech is prohibited rather than compelled, 
reasonableness-scrutiny is ratcheted up to intermediate scrutiny.”); 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1192 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying 
strict scrutiny but noting that the outcome would be the same if the court applied 
intermediate scrutiny). 
 246. See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality 
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Unsurprisingly then, analysts across the political spectrum were 
hopeful that Becerra would ameliorate the circuit split and provide 
the coherent framework omitted in Casey.247 
In a 5–4 opinion, penned by Justice Clarence Thomas, the 
Court struck down both provisions of the Reproductive FACT 
Act.248 Thomas began his analysis by belying the idea that a 
category of speech called “professional speech,” separate and 
differentiable from speech qua speech, exists.249 “Speech is not 
unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals’”250 
Justice Thomas wrote, in a statement reminiscent of Robert 
Post.251 At first glance, the statement reads as definitive: 
professional speech as a unique category of speech does not exist.252 
Rather, professional speech is speech like any other; it is not, to 
use Thomas’s phrasing, “subject to different rules.”253 In the 
ensuing analysis, however, Justice Thomas was explicit not only in 
carving out instances in which professional speech is, in fact, 
subject to different rules—but also in moderating his initial 
statement to the point of near negation.254 To the first point, 
Justice Thomas acknowledged that both (1) compelled disclosures 
                                                                                                     
Trap, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 150, 167 (2017) (“Several competing approaches to 
professional speech have emerged as such cases have percolated through the 
federal courts.”). 
 247. See, e.g., id. at 171 (advocating for the Eleventh Circuit’s framework); 
Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. 
REV. 67, 112 (2016) (concluding that professional speech should receive the 
“highest levels of constitutional protection”). 
 248. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2377 (2018) (“Even if California had presented a nonhypothetical justification for 
the unlicensed notice, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech.”). 
 249. See id. at 2371 (“[T]his Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as 
a separate category of speech.”). 
 250. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. 
 251. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (regarding Post’s definition of 
“speech uttered in the course of professional practice as distinct from speech 
uttered by a professional”). 
 252. See id. at 2372 (noting the Court’s reluctance to add new categories to 
exclude from constitutional protection). 
 253. Id. at 2371. 
 254. See id. at 2372 (“This Court’s precedents have applied a lower level of 
scrutiny to laws that compel disclosures in certain contexts.”). 
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by professionals of “purely factual and uncontroversial 
information,” and (2) professional speech that is closely tied to 
professional conduct, are subject to a lesser standard of review.255 
To the second point, Justice Thomas conceded that the type of 
professional speech that does not fall within one of the two 
approved exceptions is “a difficult category to define with 
precision.”256 He further stated that even when such a feat is 
accomplished— that is, even when a court is able to accurately 
determine that a given professional is speaking on a topic neither 
purely factual nor uncontroversial, and is speaking in such a way 
that the speech is divorced of conduct—there are nonetheless 
persuasive reasons for which the professional speech might still be 
“exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.”257 At this 
point, a critical observer might reasonably ask: which reasons are 
persuasive? Justice Thomas expounded on this point with only one 
sentence: “We do not foreclose the possibility that some such 
reason exists.”258 Or, put another way, there might be such a thing 
as professional speech— sometimes. 
Ultimately, Becerra’s outcome is perhaps best described as a 
loss for the pro-choice agenda and, if anything, a tepid win for free 
speech.259 Certainly, it did little to resolve the existing circuit 
split.260 For those hoping for elucidation of professional speech’s 
First Amendment standing, the decision likely raises more 
questions than it answered. A coherent framework—for 
identifying professional speech in the first place, and for assigning 
                                                                                                     
 255. Id. at 2372–74 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992)). 
 256. Id. at 2375. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See Emma Green, The Supreme Court Hands a Win to the Pro-Life 
Movement, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-supreme-court-hands-
a-win-to-the-pro-life-movement/563738/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Looking 
ahead, the Court’s decision . . . may be most consequential as a boundary line for 
the way the government treats pro-life groups.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 260. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2375 (2018) (recognizing that there is the possibility that professional speech 
should be exempt from First Amendment principles). 
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it an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny in the second—remains 
elusive. 
IV. Physician Speech: Low-, Medium-, or High-Value? 
Progress is rarely value-neutral.261 Some measure of societal 
distress, if not outright controversy, frequently accompanies 
intellectual advancement.262 Within the last ten years the 
accumulation of medical knowledge on three diverse topics— gun 
violence, sexual orientation, and abortion sequelae— has triggered 
an amalgam of cases that have divided legal opinion on the First 
Amendment value of physician speech.263 For our purposes, these 
cases have predictive value for anticipating legal responses to 
restrictions on physician speech in the PWGS context. 
A. Physician Gag Laws and Gun Safety 
In July 2010, Amber Ullman entered the pediatrician’s office 
in Ocala, Florida for her daughter’s four-month check-up.264 
Following a series of health-and-safety questions— for example, 
“Do you have a pool? Do you use a car seat?”—Dr. Chris Okonkwo 
asked: “Do you keep a gun in the house?”265 When Ms. Ullman 
                                                                                                     
 261. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
43, 92 (1989) (asserting that constitutional interpretation inevitably invokes a 
subjective process of examining the intentions of the drafters and the ratifiers 
and deciding whose views are more important). 
 262. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public 
Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 170–71 (2006) (reasoning that disagreements 
over the consequences of law stem from differences in values resulting in 
polarized beliefs which persist in the face of scientific advancement). 
 263. See infra Parts IV.A–C (analyzing recent cases regarding gun violence, 
sexual orientation, and abortion sequelae). 
 264. See Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle Over Gun Question, 
OCALA STAR BANNER (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.ocala.com/article/20100723/News/604191215 (last visited Apr. 16, 
2019) (reporting a disagreement between a physician and a parent regarding 
questions about gun ownership) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 265. See id.  
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refused to answer, Dr. Okonkwo completed the exam but advised 
the Ullmans that they would need to find another pediatrician.266 
He later told the local paper he would have done the same if Ms. 
Ullman had refused to disclose information about whether she had 
a pool or smoked in the house.267 “I don’t tell them to get rid of the 
guns,” Dr. Okonkwo stated, “The purpose [of the question] is to 
give [safety] advice.”268 
Six months later, prompted by the “Ocala incident,”269 State 
Representative Jason Brodeur introduced House Bill 155 as “[a]n 
act relating to the privacy of firearm owners.”270 In April 2011, the 
Florida Senate passed the Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act 
(FOPA).271 Section 790.338 of the Act reads: 
A health care practitioner . . . shall respect a patient’s right to 
privacy and should refrain from making a written inquiry or 
asking questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or 
ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the 
patient, or the presence of a firearm in a private home . . . .272 
The Act further stated that physicians “should refrain from 
unnecessarily harassing a patient about firearm ownership during 
an examination.”273 Finally, the Act mandated that FOPA 
violations were punishable by fines up to $10,000 per offense, 
letters of reprimand, probation, suspension, compulsory remedial 
education, or permanent revocation of the offender’s medical 
license.274 Governor Rick Scott signed the Act into law on June 2, 
                                                                                                     
 266. See id. (“[Okonkwo] said he respected a patient’s right not to answer 
questions, but it was also his right to no longer treat them.”). 
 267. See id. (“[T]he doctor and patient have to develop a relationship of trust 
and that if parents won’t answer such basic safety questions, how could they trust 
each other about more important health issues.”). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment at 1, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. 
Fla. 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-22026-MCG). 
 270. H.B. 155, 2011 Leg., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), 2011 Bill Tracking FL 
H.B. 155 (LexisNexis). 
 271. See id. (reporting on the passage of the bill and its signature by the 
governor). 
 272. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (Westlaw through Apr. 8, 2019). 
 273. Id. § 790.338(6). 
 274. See id. §§ 790.338(8), 456.072 (mandating disciplinary action by Florida’s 
Board of Medicine). 
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2011.275 At least a dozen other states introduced similar legislation 
thereafter.276 
1. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
On June 24, 2011, a group of Florida physicians filed suit in 
federal court.277 The complaint alleged First Amendment 
violations attendant to physicians’ right to “engage in open and 
free exchanges of information and advice with their patients.”278 
Plaintiffs filed declarations demonstrating that many physicians 
consider firearm inquiries routine in the practice of preventative 
medicine.279 Official guidelines issued by the American Academy of 
                                                                                                     
 275. See H.B. 155, 2011 Leg., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), 2011 Bill Tracking 
FL H.B. 155 (LexisNexis). 
 276. See Olga Khazan, The Strange Laws that Dictate What Your Doctor Tells 
You, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/the-laws-that-stand-
between-you-and-your-doctor/410722/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Fourteen 
states have introduced similar legislation since [FOPA], though none as 
restrictive as Florida’s have been enacted.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Alexis Macias, When States Practice Medicine: Physician Gag Laws, 
97 BULL. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 39, 39–40 (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://bulletin.facs.org/2012/02/when-states-practice-medicine-physician-gag-
laws/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (reporting on NRA-sponsored bills in Alabama, 
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Mobeen H. Rathore, Physician “Gag Laws” 
and Gun Safety, 16 AMA J. ETHICS 235, 284 (2014) (stating that twelve other 
states followed Florida by introducing physician gag laws). 
 277. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 1, Wollschlaeger 
v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 
1:11-cv-22026) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief declaring the law 
unconstitutional and preventing enforcement of FOPA). 
 278. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 1, 
Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026). 
 279. See, e.g., Declaration of Judith Schaechter, MD at ¶ 13, Wollschlaeger I, 
880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (“I am afraid this law could be 
interpreted as allowing doctors to ask about guns only if they believe a danger to 
the patient is imminent—an interpretation that would preclude standard 
preventative care as part of my patients’ care.”); Declaration of Dr. Tommy 
Schechtman at ¶ 7, Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (“I 
routinely ask patients during checkups about a long list of risk factors, including 
whether guns are present in the home.”); Declaration of Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger 
at ¶ 8, Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (“As a family 
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Pediatrics, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and the 
American College of Physicians similarly validated preventative 
firearm inquiries.280 
In the district court, the State argued that the Act was not a 
speech regulation.281 FOPA “prohibits harassment and 
discrimination, not speech,” the State insisted.282 District Court 
Judge Marcia Cross was unconvinced.283 “Under this law,” Judge 
Cross said, “physicians may ask a new patient complaining of a 
stomachache . . . questions regarding household chemicals, risky 
recreational activities, sexual conduct, or drugs and alcohol kept 
in the home, but not whether the patient owns a firearm.”284 She 
classified FOPA’s provisions as content-based speech 
restrictions.285 Acknowledging that the standard for professional 
speech was an “unsettled question of law,”286 Judge Cross 
nonetheless struck FOPA down as unconstitutional.287 “I need not 
decide [here] which standard applies because the State would not 
prevail under either test [i.e., heightened or strict],” she stated.288 
                                                                                                     
practitioner, I consider anticipatory guidance regarding safe firearm practices to 
be a key part of preventative health consultations, in light of the significant 
health risks posed by firearms to my patients.”). 
 280. See, e.g., M. Denise Dowd & Robert D. Sege, Firearm-Related Injuries 
Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS e1416, e1416 (2012) (“The 
absence of guns from children’s homes and communities is the most reliable and 
effective measure to prevent firearm-related injuries in children and 
adolescents.”). 
 281. See Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 1, Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 
1:11-cv-22026) (“Section 790.338 does not prohibit speech.”). 
 282. Id. (capitalization altered). 
 283. See Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“Despite 
the State’s arguments to the contrary, the anti-discrimination and 
anti-harassment provisions are also content-based.”). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. (“[FOPA] purports to regulate practitioners’ inquiries, 
record-keeping, discrimination, and harassment with respect to one subject 
matter only— firearm ownership and possession.”). 
 286. Id. at 1262–63. 
 287. See id. at 1267 (“This law chills practitioners’ speech in a way that 
impairs the provision of medical care and may ultimately harm the patient.”). 
 288. Id. at 1263 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) 
(plurality opinion)). 
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The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment.289 
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach 
On appeal, the State continued to argue that the Act’s 
language— physicians “should refrain” from asking patients about 
firearms— was merely hortatory.290 As such, the State argued that 
FOPA posed (if anything) only incidental burdens on speech.291 
Like the district court, the Eleventh Circuit was unconvinced by 
the State’s hortatory argument.292 Unlike the district court, Circuit 
Judge Tjoflat found the State’s broader defense compelling.293 The 
Act, as he described it, “merely reaffirm[ed] the boundaries 
surrounding what constitutes good medical practice.”294 He 
eschewed the idea that physicians had any type of free speech 
rights within the confines of the physician-patient relationship.295 
He reasoned that conversations in the exam room were not 
                                                                                                     
 289. See id. at 1270 (enjoining enforcement of the statute). 
 290. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger II), 760 F.3d 1195, 
1207 (11th Cir. 2014) (relaying the State’s argument that the statutory language 
does not constitute a bar on speech). At an evidentiary hearing in the district 
court, the defense counsel described the State’s position regarding statutory 
construction: “It recommends to practitioners that they refrain from asking about 
firearm ownership in most cases,” the defense stated, “but it does not prohibit it.” 
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Before the Honorable Marcia G. Cooke at 29, 
Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 1:11-cv-22026) (emphasis added). 
Defense counsel also stressed that FOPA contained a good-faith exception, 
allowing practitioners to discuss firearms in cases of medical necessity. See H.B. 
155 § 790.338(2), 2011 Leg., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011). 
 291. See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1207 (summarizing the State’s 
argument that the District Court erred in its finding that FOPA was facially 
unconstitutional). 
 292. See id. at 1212 (“Laws—such as the Act—that provide for disciplinary 
action in case of violation should generally not be interpreted as hortatory.”). 
 293. See id. at 1217 (“To define the standards of good medical practice and 
provide for administrative enforcement of those standards is well within the 
State’s long-established authority to regulate the professions.”). 
 294. Id. at 1215. 
 295. See id. (“Insofar as Plaintiffs claim a generalized interest in being able 
to speak freely to their patients, such conversation (if not relevant to medical care) 
is outside the boundaries of the physician–patient relationship.”). 
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speech—they were medicine.296 Writing for a divided three-judge 
panel, Judge Tjoflat wrote: “The Act simply informs physicians 
that inquiring about a private matter irrelevant to medical care is 
not part of the practice of good medicine, and that, as always, a 
physician may face discipline for not practicing good medicine.”297 
The court concluded that FOPA regulated professional conduct, 
not speech, and thus did not implicate the First Amendment.298 
Circuit Judge Wilson disagreed with the majority’s application 
of rational basis review.299 “Simply put,” Judge Wilson wrote in his 
excoriating dissent, “the Act is a gag order.”300 To his mind, 
labeling the speech “conduct” and the speakers “professionals” did 
not belie the simple fact that FOPA prohibited conversations about 
one topic by one group of speakers.301 Moreover, he considered the 
majority’s position “based on a misreading of Casey.”302 Indeed, 
contrary to the majority’s assertion that Casey removed the First 
Amendment from medical practice entirely,303 the text of that 
opinion explicitly said the opposite— i.e., “First Amendment 
rights . . . are implicated.”304 By Judge Wilson’s reading, Casey had 
applied some level of First Amendment scrutiny to the 
Pennsylvania regulation, though ascertaining which level from 
two sentences was an admittedly harder task.305 After considering 
Casey’s application in other circuits, and parsing the opinion itself 
for clues, Judge Wilson concluded that Casey “applied something 
akin to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny,” and that nothing 
                                                                                                     
 296. See id. (describing inquiries into gun ownership as “conduct outside of 
the bounds of good medical practice”).  
 297. Id. at 1219–20.  
 298. See id. at 1217, 1230 (reversing the district court). 
 299. See id. at 1239 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (asserting that the law would fail 
under strict or intermediate scrutiny). 
 300. Id. at 1230. 
 301. Id. at 1231, 1236. 
 302. Id. at 1243. 
 303. See id. at 1222 n.16 (majority opinion) (stating that the Casey court 
allowed states “to some extent regulate physician speech within the confines of 
the physician-patient relationship ‘as part of the practice of medicine’ without 
violating the First Amendment”). 
 304. Id. at 1245 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)). 
 305. Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting) (recognizing the Court’s lack of clarity 
regarding the standard applied in Casey). 
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less should be applied to FOPA.306 He noted, also, the legal 
implications of the majority’s decision—namely, that every 
one-to-one professional relationship would now be regulable 
without scrutiny.307 “I do not so simply identify a slippery slope,” 
Judge Wilson wrote, “[rather,] today’s decision brings us to the 
bottom of that slope.”308 He concluded, “health care in Florida [will 
be] worse, not better.”309 
3. The Eleventh Circuit Redux 
In July 2015, the same three-judge panel issued a revised 
opinion.310 The tone of it suggested that in the intervening year, 
Judge Wilson’s dissent had gained some traction. Judge Tjoflat, 
                                                                                                     
 306. Id. at 1245–46, 1256 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Even if Casey applied 
something less than intermediate scrutiny, [Zauderer] confirms that 
intermediate scrutiny applies here.”). 
 307. See id. at 1253 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (positing a hypothetical in which 
a state prohibits all discussions about firearm safety). In Becerra, the Supreme 
Court echoed Judge Wilson’s concern, noting: 
As defined by the courts of appeals, the professional speech doctrine 
would cover a wide array of individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses, 
physical therapists, truck drivers, bartenders, barbers, and many 
others. . . . All that is required to make something a “profession,” 
according to these courts, is that it involves personalized services and 
requires a professional license from the State. But that gives the State 
unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights by 
simply imposing a licensing requirement. 
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) 
(citations omitted). 
 308. Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d 1195, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., 
dissenting). 
 309. Id. at 1257 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting that numerous medical 
associations support his conclusion regarding FOPA’s detrimental effect on 
health care). 
 310. Eleventh Circuit Judges Tjoflat and Wilson, joined by Northern District 
of Alabama Judge Coogler, vacated their original opinion sua sponte, mooting 
Petitioners’ request for rehearing en banc. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. 
(Wollschlaeger III), 797 F.3d 859, 868 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859 (No. 12-14009) (“The 
majority erroneously held that a government may, under guise of regulating 
medical practice, silence physicians from providing medical advice even to squelch 
a perceived political viewpoint.”). 
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writing again for the majority, began by observing that “[t]he 
State’s analysis,” which the court had validated and adopted in its 
first opinion, “proceeds at such a high level of generality that all 
laws regulating the practice of a profession . . . would always pass 
muster under the First Amendment.”311 To appropriately narrow 
the analysis, the majority devised a four-category grid to capture 
the universe of physician speech: (1) speech to the public in 
furtherance of medicine; (2) speech to a patient in furtherance of 
medicine; (3) speech to a patient on a matter irrelevant to 
medicine; and (4) speech to the public on a matter irrelevant to 
medicine.312 The majority— retreating from its original position 
that FOPA regulated only professional conduct— classified firearm 
inquiries as category 2 speech.313 Reasoning that regulation of 
professional practices had long been within the purview of the 
states’ police power, the court held that category 2 speech was 
subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny.314 The higher 
level of scrutiny notwithstanding, the outcome was the same, by 
the same 2–1 vote.315 Judge Wilson, again the lone dissenter, 
commented: “The Majority is now persuaded that the Act is subject 
to some level of scrutiny under the First Amendment. It is the 
analysis that follows where we part ways . . . .”316 Judge Wilson’s 
second dissent was similar to his first.317 It turned on his belief that 
the majority was devaluing professional speech “precisely because 
the speakers are so qualified.”318 Put another way, a speaker’s 
                                                                                                     
 311. Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 884 (emphasis in original). 
 312. See id. at 888 n.15 (providing a visual grid to illustrate the categories). 
Note that Bandy Lee et al.’s The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump would likely 
fall into the court’s fourth category. See generally THE DANGEROUS CASE OF 
DONALD TRUMP (Bandy X. Lee ed. 2017) (compiling assessments from 
psychiatrists and mental health experts regarding Donald Trump’s mental state). 
 313. See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 891 n.17 (concluding that FOPA 
regulated professional speech). 
 314. See id. at 893, 895–96 (discussing the duty of the states to protect the 
public against incompetent or untrustworthy professionals). 
 315. See id. at 901 (upholding FOPA but cautioning that the decision does not 
reflect the propriety of the law). 
 316. Id. at 901 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 317. See id. (Wilson, J., dissenting) (renewing his argument that the law does 
not survive intermediate scrutiny). 
 318. Id. at 914 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
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professional status should not serve as a basis for denying her First 
Amendment protections.319 
Two months later, the Eleventh Circuit issued an order 
requesting memorandums from the Wollschlaeger litigants. The 
court asked that they address whether Reed v. Town of Gilbert,320 
a First Amendment Supreme Court case decided in June 2015, 
necessitated the application of strict scrutiny in the instant case.321 
Then, in December 2015, the same three-judge panel issued a 
third, revised opinion.322 The majority again agreed with the 
plaintiffs that FOPA was a content-based speech regulation.323 
More promising, the majority accepted the plaintiffs’ assertion that 
Reed required the application of strict scrutiny.324 But, in a bizarre 
twist,325 the majority concluded both that the State had a 
compelling interest (in protecting patient privacy and Second 
Amendment rights),326 and that FOPA was narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.327 By the same 2–1 vote, the majority held 
                                                                                                     
 319. See id. (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“[D]octors were silenced because their 
speech was causing patients to question whether the safety concerns associated 
with firearm ownership outweighed the benefits.”). 
 320. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 321. See Memorandum to Counsel or Parties, Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859, 
884 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-14009) (directing submission within twenty days). 
Reed held that town ordinances restricting the size, number, duration, and 
location of temporary directional signs violated the First Amendment. The Court 
applied strict scrutiny. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015). 
 322. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), 814 F.3d 1159, 
1168 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding FOPA). 
 323. See id. at 1186 (applying Reed and conceding that FOPA applies to 
speech based on the “topic discussed”). 
 324. See id. at 1186 n.14 (“The Court seemed to suggest that strict scrutiny 
applies broadly to all content-based regulations of speech.” (quoting Reed, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2224–25)). 
 325. Recall that challenged laws are never supposed to survive “fatal in fact” 
strict scrutiny. See supra Part III.A and note 173 (concerning the levels of scrutiny 
and Professor Gerald Gunther assertion that strict scrutiny is typically fatal in 
fact). 
 326. See Wollschlaeger IV, 814 F.3d at 1193–95 (“Florida rightfully treats the 
privacy of [gun ownership] as sacrosanct and acts aggressively to protect it.”). 
 327. See id. at 1199 (querying “what narrower way to advance this interest 
could there be than by requiring physicians to base any inquiry or record-keeping 
about firearm ownership on a genuine, subjective determination of medical 
need?”). 
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that “the Act survives even strict scrutiny . . . .”328 Again in lone 
dissent, Judge Wilson wrote: “I decline to pen another dissent 
responding to the Majority’s evolving rationale. I rest on my 
previous dissents.”329 
In February 2016, the Eleventh Circuit finally granted the 
plaintiffs’ request for the case to be reheard, this time en banc, 
before a full panel of the eleven sitting judges.330 In a nod to the 
preceding three panel decisions—“each using a different First 
Amendment standard of review”331—the court began by 
recognizing that the First Amendment is “sometimes . . . difficult 
to apply.”332 But what the preceding panels had found difficult, the 
full court disposed of easily.333 Quoting one of Judge Wilson’s 
earlier dissents, the court intoned, “[S]aying that restrictions on 
writing and speaking are merely incidental to speech is like saying 
that limitations on walking and running are merely incidental to 
ambulation.”334 The court similarly agreed with Judge Wilson’s 
“bottom of the slope” argument: 
If rationality were the standard, the government could—based 
on its disagreement with the message being conveyed—easily tell 
architects that they cannot propose buildings in the style of I.M. 
Pei, or general contractors that they cannot suggest the use of 
cheaper foreign steel in construction projects, or accountants that 
they cannot discuss legal tax avoidance techniques, and so on and 
so on.335 
After determining that the standard was not rational basis, 
however, the court declined to decide anything further.336 Circuit 
Judge Jordan, the majority’s representative on this final round, 
held that FOPA’s provisions could not withstand even heightened 
                                                                                                     
 328. Id. at 1186. 
 329. Id. at 1202 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 330. See Order Granting Petition for Rehearing at 2, Wollschlaeger v. 
Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger V), 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 12-14009). 
 331. Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 332. Id. at 1300. 
 333. See id. at 1301 (analyzing with heightened scrutiny under Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 553 (2011)). 
 334. Id. at 1308. 
 335. Id. at 1311. 
 336. See id. (“Because these provisions fail to satisfy heightened scrutiny 
under Sorrell, they obviously would not withstand strict scrutiny.”). 
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scrutiny, obviating any need to determine whether strict scrutiny 
should apply.337 The court concluded that firearm inquiries—even 
if conducted via “blanket questioning”—would not lead to the 
practice of bad medicine.338 At its crux, the Eleventh Circuit’s final 
opinion endorsed the aphorism “knowledge is power” or, to use the 
court’s phrasing, “information can save lives.”339 Judge Wilson 
concurred, taking care to note that he would apply strict scrutiny 
but reach the same result.340 FOPA was struck down as 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.341 
The Eleventh Circuit’s seesawing between levels of judicial 
scrutiny—from rational basis to intermediate to strict, and back 
again—is telling. Its four incongruous opinions highlight the 
marked opacity of the legal standard for professional speech.342 
B. Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy 
Sexual orientation conversion efforts (SOCE) refer to 
psychoanalytic techniques designed to redirect same-sex sexual 
desires toward people of a different sex.343 More succinctly, SOCE 
is talk therapy meant to cure homosexuality.344 There is no 
                                                                                                     
 337. See id. (declining to decide whether strict scrutiny should apply). 
 338. Id. at 1316 (“There is no claim, much less any evidence, that routine 
questions to patients about the ownership of firearms are medically 
inappropriate, ethically problematic, or practically ineffective.”). 
 339. Id. at 1313 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)). 
 340. Id. at 1324 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 341. Id. at 1323 (“In this quintessential First Amendment area, the State may 
not hinge liability on a phrase so ambiguous in nature.”). 
 342. See id. at 1310–11 (summarizing jurisprudence regarding the standard 
of scrutiny for professional speech). 
 343. See Healing Arts: Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: Hearing on S.B. 
1172 Before the S. Comm. on Bus., Professions & Econ. Dev., 2012 Leg. (Cal. 2012) 
(defining “sexual orientation change efforts”). 
 344. A. Lee Beckstead, Can We Change Sexual Orientation?, 41 ARCHIVES 
SEXUAL BEHAV. 121, 123 (2012). Historically, SOCE is not limited to talk 
therapies. For an expanded discussion of historical methodologies, see David B. 
Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of 
Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1303–10 (1999) (describing the 
evolution of procedures used through history to try and “cure” homosexuality 
including surgery, chemicals, drugs, and therapy). 
PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT 635 
evidence that SOCE is effective,345 and the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) has explicitly disavowed its use.346 In September 
2012, Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 1172, making 
California the first state to ban state-licensed therapists from 
performing SOCE on any patient under eighteen years of age.347 A 
year later, Governor Chris Christie approved identical legislation, 
Assembly Bill 3371, in New Jersey.348 
1. Pickup v. Brown: The Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
In 2014, two circuit courts—the Ninth Circuit, addressing the 
California ban, and the Third Circuit, addressing the New Jersey 
ban— confronted legal challenges to SOCE bans.349 In both cases, 
plaintiff-counselors alleged free speech violations.350 In the Ninth 
                                                                                                     
 345. Annie Bartlett et al., The Response of Mental Health Professionals to 
Clients Seeking Help to Change or Redirect Same-Sex Sexual Orientation, 9 BMC 
PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (2009) (summarizing that no recent or earlier published 
literature evidences that a person’s sexual orientation can be changed). 
 346 See JUDITH M. GLASSGOLD ET AL., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE 
THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION, 3–4 (2009) (synthesizing 
psychological knowledge and recommending therapeutic approaches providing 
acceptance and support).  
 347. See Jerry Brown, California Governor, Signs SB 1172, Bill Banning Gay 
Conversion Therapy for Minors, HUFFINGTON POST, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jerry-brown-sb-1172-gay-conversion-therapy-
california_n_1926855 (last updated Feb. 2, 2016) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) 
(summarizing the types of therapy banned under the law and the public response 
to the bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 348. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:1–55 (2013) (banning SOCE for minors); Martha 
T. Moore, N.J. Gov. Christie Signs Ban on Gay Conversion Therapy, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/19/chris-christie-gay-
conversion-therapy-new-jersey/2671197/ (last updated Aug. 19, 2013, 6:07 PM) 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (summarizing the types of therapy banned under the 
law and the public response to the bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 349. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(challenging New Jersey law prohibiting “licensed counselors from engaging in 
‘sexual orientation change efforts’ with a client under the age of 18”); Pickup v. 
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging California law 
prohibiting “state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in ‘sexual 
orientation change efforts’ with patients under 18 years of age”). 
 350. See King, 767 F.3d at 222 (summarizing the basis of plaintiffs’ 
allegations); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1224–25 (summarizing the basis of plaintiffs’ 
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Circuit case, Pickup v. Brown,351 the court adopted a framework 
resembling that proposed in the Eleventh Circuit’s second 
Wollschlaeger opinion.352 Instead of a four-category grid, the Ninth 
Circuit imagined a continuum.353 At one end was professional 
speech within a public dialogue (the Eleventh Circuit’s category 1 
and category 4 speech).354 At the continuum’s midpoint was speech 
that occurs within a physician-patient relationship (the Eleventh 
Circuit’s category 2 and category 3 speech), like that in Casey.355 
And at the other end of the continuum was professional conduct, 
which is not speech at all (off the Eleventh Circuit’s grid).356 The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that SB 1172 regulated talk therapy as 
medical conduct, not talk therapy as expressive speech.357 
Unsurprisingly, that conclusion dictated rational basis review and 
SB 1172 was upheld.358 
                                                                                                     
allegations). 
 351. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 352. See id. at 1227 (“In determining whether SB 1172 is a regulation of 
speech or conduct, we find it helpful to view this issue along a continuum.”). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Compare Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227 (using a continuum to analyze the 
statute at issue), with Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859, 888 (11th Cir. 2015) (using 
a four-category grid to analyze the statute at issue). 
 355. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228–29 (explaining the midpoint of the 
continuum where certain limits on speech will be tolerated such that they fall 
within “reasonable licensing and regulation by the State” of the practice of 
medicine). 
 356. See id. at 1229 (explaining that the state has great power to regulate 
professional conduct even though it may incidentally implicate a professional’s 
speech). 
 357. See id. at 1229–30 (concluding California’s prohibition on sexual 
orientation conversion therapy for minors was a Constitutional regulation of 
professional conduct). 
 358. See id. at 1231–32 (“Because SB 1172 regulates only treatment, while 
leaving mental health providers free to discuss and recommend, or recommend 
against, SOCE, we conclude . . . that SB 1172 is subject to only rational basis 
review.”). 
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2. King v. Governor of New Jersey: The Third Circuit’s Approach 
The Third Circuit heard King v. Governor of New Jersey359 
almost six months after the Ninth Circuit decided Pickup.360 The 
majority opinion opened similarly: “[T]he question we confront is 
whether verbal communications become ‘conduct’ when they are 
used as a vehicle for mental health treatment.”361 The District 
Court had relied heavily on Pickup, and the Third Circuit also 
considered the obvious parallels on appeal.362 But Circuit Judge 
Smith, writing for a unanimous panel of three, found greater 
alignment with Ninth Circuit Judge O’Scannlain, who had 
dissented in Pickup, than with the majority.363 The Ninth Circuit’s 
continuum was “nothing more than a ‘labeling game,’” lacking a 
doctrinally sound methodology for separating protected speech 
from unprotected conduct.364 Under such an approach, courts could 
simply label unpopular speech “conduct” and do away with First 
Amendment scrutiny.365 “Speech is speech,” Judge Smith 
concluded, “and it must be analyzed as such.”366 In terms of the 
level of scrutiny, however, the Third Circuit found professional 
speech— though undoubtedly speech— was not comparable to pure 
speech.367 It bore a greater resemblance to commercial speech.368 
Both serve an “informational function” and both occur in 
traditionally highly-regulated contexts.369 The Third Circuit thus 
                                                                                                     
 359. 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 360. See id. at 226–28 (summarizing and discussing Pickup). 
 361. See id. at 224. 
 362. See id. at 223–24 (summarizing the New Jersey district court’s 
application of Pickup). 
 363. See id. at 227–28 (summarizing O’Scannlain’s dissent in Pickup). 
 364. See id. (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). 
 365. See id. at 229 (explaining that “[b]y labeling certain communications as 
“conduct,” thereby assuring that they receive no First Amendment protection at 
all”). 
 366. Id. 
 367. See id. at 230–31 (explaining that appeals courts have interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s Casey decision as “establish[ing] special rules for the regulation 
of speech that occurs pursuant to the practice of a licensed profession”). 
 368. See id. at 234 (“We believe that commercial and professional speech 
share important qualities. . . .”). 
 369. See id. (determining that professional speech is similar to commercial 
speech and thus applying intermediate scrutiny). 
638 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577 (2019) 
 
applied commercial speech’s intermediate scrutiny.370 Given the 
empirical evidence in the legislative record (demonstrating a 
dearth of credible evidence of SOCE’s efficacy), and given the 
special vulnerability of the population (minors) New Jersey’s ban 
was designed to protect, the court concluded that A3371 “directly 
advances New Jersey’s stated interest in protecting minor citizens 
from harmful professional practices,” via sufficiently tailored 
means.371 
Though both California’s and New Jersey’s SOCE bans were 
upheld, the Ninth and Third Circuits each applied different levels 
of judicial scrutiny.372 Moreover, both circuits adopted approaches 
not wholly consistent with the final Wollschlaeger opinion.373 
C. Abortion Sequelae 
Ultrasound imaging has been a component of pregnancy care 
in the Western world for decades, and standard since at least 
1978.374 In the early 1980s, pro-life advocates identified the 
technology as an opportunity for abortion deterrence.375 The 
                                                                                                     
 370. See id.  
 371. See id. at 239–40 (applying intermediate scrutiny analysis to the New 
Jersey statue banning sexual orientation conversion therapy). 
 372. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(determining that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review); Pickup 
v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that rational basis 
review is the proper standard of review). 
 373. In fact, the King court cited with approval the Eleventh Circuit’s first 
Wollschlaeger opinion, which was, of course, vacated and replaced three times. 
King, 767 F.3d at 231–32 (citing Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d 1195, 1207 (11th Cir. 
2014)). 
 374. See Gillian Harris et al., “Seeing the Baby”: Pleasures and Dilemmas of 
Ultrasound Technologies for Primiparous Australian Women, 18 MED. 
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 23, 24 (2004) (evaluating the use of ultrasound during 
pregnancy) (citing Ann Oakley, The History of Ultrasonography in Obstetrics, 13 
BIRTH 8 (1986)). 
 375. See, e.g., Robert M. Godzeno, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in 
Informed Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
285, 303 & n.127 (2009) (citing Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 
1984) which struck down pre-abortion mandatory ultrasound law); THE SILENT 
SCREAM (American Portrait Films 1984) (depicting the abortion process via 
ultrasound). 
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strategy hinges on the contested assumption that ultrasound 
examinations are emotionally-laden events for all pregnant 
women.376 There is evidence to suggest that the viewing of an 
ultrasound does have a positive impact on maternal-fetal 
attachment— in wanted pregnancies.377 Research suggests the 
impact is greater the earlier the ultrasound is performed.378 
However, there is also a substantial body of research suggesting 
that ultrasounds have a varied impact in the abortion context. A 
2012 study indicated that in the case of unwanted pregnancy, 
many women do not consider an ultrasound helpful to their 
decision-making.379 In fact, a 2014 analysis of over 15,000 
pregnancies showed that 98.4% of abortion-seekers proceed to 
termination even after viewing an ultrasound.380 Another study, 
again using a dataset of more than 15,000 abortion care visits from 
2011, demonstrated that most women would decline to view the 
ultrasound image.381 Of course, given a mandatory 
speech-and-display ultrasound law, declining is not an option.382 
                                                                                                     
 376. See Godzeno, supra note 375, at 287 (describing the three types of laws 
promulgated by states requiring women to receive an ultrasound “before [the] 
woman can give informed consent to an abortion”).  
 377. See Lisa M. Mitchell, Women’s Experiences of Unexpected Ultrasound 
Findings, 49 J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 228, 232 (2004) (suggesting that 
seeing an image on screen “can make its existence ‘real’”); B. Sedgmen et al., The 
Impact of Two-Dimensional Versus Three-Dimensional Ultrasound Exposure on 
Maternal-Fetal Attachment and Maternal Health Behavior in Pregnancy, 27 
ULTRASOUND OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 245, 250 (2006) (exploring the effects 
that viewing ultrasounds can have on a mother’s behavior during pregnancy); 
Claude Villeneuve et al., Psychological Aspects of Ultrasound Imaging During 
Pregnancy, 33 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 530, 534 (1988) (“The exam had a positive effect 
[on expectant parents] and seemed to enhance bonding.”). 
 378. See Sedgmen et al., supra note 377 (discussing findings consistent with 
a positive impact and stating that “impact is greatest earlier in pregnancy”). 
 379. See Katrina Kimport et al., Women’s Perspectives on Ultrasound Viewing 
in the Abortion Care Context, 22 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e513, e517 (2012) 
(summarizing the results of twenty interviews conducted with women who 
received ultrasounds when seeking an abortion). 
 380. See Mary Gatter et al., Relationship Between Ultrasound Viewing and 
Proceeding to Abortion, 123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 81, 85 (2014) (finding that 
viewing an ultrasound had a limited effect on a woman’s choice to seek an 
abortion). 
 381. See Katrina Kimport et al., Patient Viewing of the Ultrasound Image 
Prior to Abortion, 88 CONCEPTION 666, 668 (2013) (summarizing the results of a 
study investigating ultrasound usage when a woman is seeking an abortion). 
 382. See Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., 
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Whatever the actual deterrent effect of such laws, more than half 
of the states regulate pre-abortion ultrasounds.383 Three states 
have passed so-called speech-and-display laws, the most 
aggressive form of ultrasound regulation.384 
1. Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services. 
v. Lakey: The Fifth Circuit’s Approach 
In 2011, the Texas State Legislature amended its 2003 
Woman’s Right to Know Act (WRTK)385 to include a 
speech-and-display provision. Styled as an informed consent 
safeguard, House Bill 15 required physicians to: 
perform[] a sonogram on the pregnant woman on whom the 
abortion is to be performed; display[] the sonogram images in a 
quality consistent with current medical practice in a manner 
that the pregnant woman may view them; . . . provide[], in a 
manner understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of 
the results of the sonogram images . . . [and to] make audible 
the heart auscultation for the pregnant woman to hear, if 
present, in a quality consistent with current medical practice 
and provide[], in a manner understandable to a layperson, a 
simultaneous verbal explanation of the heart auscultation[.]386 
H.B. 15 did not allow pregnant women, absent incest or rape, 
to decline a sonogram or opt not to hear the heartbeat and 
explanation of the sonogram images.387 The Act mandated denial 
                                                                                                     
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (last 
updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (stating that three states have 
mandatory ultrasound laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 383. See id. (stating that twenty-six states regulate the provision of 
ultrasound by abortion providers). 
 384. See id. (“[Three] states mandate that an abortion provider perform an 
ultrasound on each woman seeking an abortion and requires the provider to show 
and describe the image.”). 
 385. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(A)–(D) (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 386. Id. 
 387. See id. § 171.012(a)(5) (providing a required medical form which informs 
a pregnant woman that she must hear the explanation of the sonogram images). 
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or revocation of a physician’s medical license for failure to 
comply.388 
Texas physicians and abortion providers immediately 
challenged H.B. 15 on First Amendment grounds.389 The District 
Court granted a preliminary injunction.390 On the State’s appeal, 
the Fifth Circuit ordered expedited briefing and oral argument to 
consider whether Texas’s speech-and-display provisions were 
substantively different than the provisions upheld in Casey.391 Like 
Pennsylvania’s informed consent statute, H.B. 15 compelled 
physicians to deliver “medically accurate depictions.”392 Unlike 
Pennsylvania’s law, however, H.B. 15’s mode of delivery was, 
Appellees argued, “qualitatively different.”393 In Casey, the 
Supreme Court upheld a law dictating a passive information 
exchange— i.e., Pennsylvania physicians were only required to 
make certain materials “available” to abortion-seekers.394 But H.B. 
15 not only compelled Texas physicians to verbally deliver 
information themselves, but also compelled pregnant women to 
listen.395 Moreover, the law dictated the context and content of the 
conversation such that the information exchange amounted to 
advocacy, making physicians the “‘mouthpiece’ of the state.”396 The 
Fifth Circuit disagreed.397 The information delivered via sonogram 
                                                                                                     
 388. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 164.055(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.) (providing the punishment for failure to comply with TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 171.012). 
 389. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 947–48 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (challenging H.B. 15 for “compelling 
physicians and patients to engage in government-mandated speech and 
expression”), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 390. See id. at 977 (granting preliminary injunction). 
 391. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing the similarities between the Pennsylvania 
law upheld in Casey with the Texas law). 
 392. See id. at 577 (describing the requirements of the Texas law). 
 393. See id. at 578–79 (summarizing the appellee’s argument). 
 394. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) 
(“This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an 
abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.”). 
 395. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(5) (requiring the 
pregnant woman to hear an explanation of the sonogram images). 
 396. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579 (addressing appellees’ criticism of the Texas 
law). 
 397. See id. (articulating that Casey does not provide the “ceiling” of what can 
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was not “different in kind” from the disclosures in Casey.398 Rather, 
the information was of the same kind— i.e., medically accurate, 
inherently truthful, and non-misleading.399 The only difference 
between the Pennsylvania law and H.B. 15 was that H.B. 15 called 
for “more graphic and scientifically up-to-date information.”400 The 
Fifth Circuit concluded that in terms of constitutional analysis, the 
mode of delivery was immaterial.401 The court applied Casey-level 
scrutiny (a standard it referred to as “the antithesis of strict 
scrutiny”)402 and upheld H.B. 15.403 By the majority’s reasoning, 
then, compelled speech— so long as it is medically accurate— is not 
subject to heightened scrutiny.404 Indeed, as Circuit Judge 
Higginbotham noted in his Lakey concurrence, if the challenged 
law compels accurate speech, it need only meet a minimum 
threshold of rationality.405 In the Fifth Circuit, medically accurate 
compelled speech is closer to professional conduct than speech.406 
                                                                                                     
be required of medical providers). 
 398. See id. at 578 (“They are not different in kind, although more graphic 
and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in Casey.”). 
 399. See id. at 578–79 (describing the required disclosures as “the epitome of 
truthful”). 
 400. See id. at 578 (“They are not different in kind, although more graphic 
and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in Casey.”). 
 401. See id. at 579 (stating that the mode of delivery did not make a 
“constitutionally significant” difference). Whether the “mode of delivery” 
matters—and more specifically, whether there is a constitutional difference 
between prohibited speech (as in Wollschlaeger, Pickup, and King) and compelled 
speech (as in Lakey and Camnitz) remains unclear, even after Becerra. See Nat’l 
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2387–88 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (decrying “the majority’s reliance on cases that prohibit 
rather than require speech” because compelled disclosures, even if controversial, 
are less likely to suppress the “marketplace of ideas” than prohibitions). 
 402. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing the standard of review applied in Casey). 
 403. See id. at 584 (“Appellees failed to demonstrate constitutional flaws in 
H.B. 15.”). 
 404. See id. (determining that the appellees were unlikely to succeed on their 
First Amendment claims). 
 405.  See id. at 585 (Higgenbotham, J., concurring) (stating that H.B. 15’s 
validity requires only “a legislative judgment that is at least rational”). 
 406. See id. at 584 (stating that appellees failed to show a constitutional flaw 
in the Texas law). 
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2. Stuart v. Camnitz: The Fourth Circuit’s Approach 
The same year that Texas passed H.B. 15, North Carolina 
introduced its own speech-and-display law.407 Its provisions were 
near identical.408 The Real-Time View Requirement (RTV)409 of 
North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know Act required abortion 
providers to “perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn 
child” and “provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display 
is depicting.”410 Interestingly, the drafters also included a caveat: 
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant 
woman from averting her eyes form the displayed images or from 
refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation.”411 The 
certification proviso dictated that pregnant women verify 
compliance with the RTV in writing, and, further, that they 
indicate whether they had averted their eyes.412 
As in Texas, physicians and abortion providers successfully 
sought a permanent injunction.413 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
assessed the District Court’s application of intermediate 
scrutiny.414 The court acknowledged that the RTV regulated both 
speech and conduct and even agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s 
characterization of it as “the epitome of truthful, non-misleading 
information.”415 It did not, however, view medical accuracy as the 
conclusive element.416 That the RTV compelled speech dealing in 
                                                                                                     
 407. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(1)–(2) (Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145)) 
(requiring certain steps be taken by medical providers prior to an abortion). 
 408. Compare id. (requiring medical providers to take certain steps prior to 
an abortion), with TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(5) (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (same). 
 409. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(1)–(2). 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. § 90-21.85(b). 
 412. See id. § 90-21.85(a)(5) (requiring women to attest to aspects of the 
medical treatment before receiving an abortion). 
 413. See Stuart v. Loomis (Stuart I), 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 611 (M.D.N.C. 2014) 
(ordering a permanent injunction of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85). 
 414. See Stuart v. Camnitz (Stuart II), 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(agreeing with the lower court’s choice to apply intermediate scrutiny). 
 415. See id. at 246 (determining that compelling speech requires a speaker “to 
change the content of his speech or even to say something where he would 
otherwise be silent” (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. V. 
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
 416. See id. (discussing the medical accuracy of the procedure). 
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facts versus opinions did not “divorce the speech from its moral or 
ideological implications.”417 To the court’s mind, wholly factual 
information— if compelled at a time “when the intended recipient 
is most vulnerable,”— constitutes a “plainly [] expressive act.”418 
The Fourth Circuit also disagreed with the Fifth (and Ninth) 
Circuit’s rational basis review.419 “With respect,” Circuit Judge 
Wilkinson intoned, “our sister circuits read too much into 
Casey.”420 Even if Casey had dictated rational basis as the standard 
for all informed consent provisos in the abortion context— a claim 
the Fourth Circuit considered dubious421—the RTV did not 
resemble the Casey statute.422 Pennsylvania had legislated only 
modest deviations from traditional informed consent. By contrast, 
North Carolina had legislated that doctors recite information, even 
when the recipient “has through ear and eye covering rendered 
herself temporarily deaf and blind.”423 Moreover, even if a woman 
elected against the “embarrassing spectacle” of blindfolding and 
ear-muffing, the Fourth Circuit felt that compelling delivery via 
the physician’s own voice was especially coercive.424 More than 
anything, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion stressed that “context 
matters.”425 The RTV “finds the patient half-naked or disrobed on 
her back on an examination table, with an ultrasound probe either 
on her belly or inserted into her vagina.”426 In such a context, 
                                                                                                     
 417. Id. 
 418. See id. at 245–46 (assessing the act of showing the pregnant woman 
images of her scans). 
 419. Id. at 249. 
 420. Id. Judge Wilkerson also suggested the Eighth Circuit was guilty of the 
same misreading in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota 
v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 248– 49 
(citing Lakey and Rounds with disapproval). 
 421. See id. (stating that Casey “hardly announces a guiding standard of 
scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving abortion”). 
 422. See id. (discussing the differences between RTV and the Casey statute). 
 423. Id. at 252.  
 424 See id. at 253 (“We can perceive no benefit to state interests from walling 
off patients and physicians in a manner antithetical to the very communication 
that lies at the heart of the informed consent process.”). 
 425. See id. at 247–48 (discussing a wholistic assessment of the North 
Carolina statute). 
 426. See id. at 255 (describing the patient’s vulnerable position). 
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compelled speech could hardly be anything other than 
constitutionally infirm.427 The Fourth Circuit held that the RTV 
did not survive even intermediate scrutiny— let alone strict, which 
was arguably the more appropriate standard.428 
D. Conclusions and Future Applications 
There is nothing even approaching judicial consensus on 
professional speech— not in definition, not in application, and 
certainly not doctrinally.429 The Eleventh Circuit applies 
intermediate scrutiny (and leaves open the possibility for strict) to 
physician speech restrictions— at least in the context of gun 
violence.430 The Ninth Circuit applies rational basis scrutiny—but 
likely only in the context of sexual orientation conversion efforts.431 
The Third Circuit applies intermediate scrutiny—but its 
commercial speech analogy likely precludes the possibility of 
stricter applications in other contexts.432 The Fifth Circuit applies 
rational basis with enough robust confidence to suggest it would 
                                                                                                     
 427. See id. (discussing how the context of the speech affects the informed 
consent assessment). 
 428. See id. at 248, 250–53 (affirming the lower court’s decisions that § 
90-21.85 of the North Carolina General Statutes violates the First Amendment). 
 429. Compare Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 
F.3d 570, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding a Texas law requiring certain speech 
of professionals), with Stuart II, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (striking a 
North Carolina statute compelling professional speech). 
 430. See Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) (upholding a 
Florida statute that discouraged medical personnel from inquiring of a patient 
about firearms). 
 431. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit did not apply rational basis in Becerra. In 
applying intermediate scrutiny, the court responded to the Fourth Circuit’s jab in 
Stuart II: “Casey’s short discussion of a physician’s First Amendment rights in 
the context of abortion means only what it says—that there was no violation of 
the physicians’ First Amendment rights given the particular facts of Casey. We 
need not ‘read too much’ into Casey’s statement . . . .” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 838 (2016) (citations omitted). Notably, the 
Ninth Circuit did not retreat from its Pickup analysis, even as it applied higher 
scrutiny to abortion-specific speech restrictions. See id. at 839 (distinguishing 
from Pickup by stating “Pickup, however, never discussed the level of scrutiny 
appropriate for speech that fell at the midpoint”). 
 432. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(challenging New Jersey law prohibiting “licensed counselors from engaging in 
‘sexual orientation change efforts’ with a client under the age of 18”). 
646 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577 (2019) 
 
do so in any context.433 Finally, the Fourth Circuit, like the 
Eleventh, applies intermediate scrutiny with the possibility for 
strict, at least in the abortion context.434 
The absence of clear legal guidelines in an area so ideologically 
charged as abortion suggests that legislatures will feel, as they 
have historically, emboldened to take speech-restricting 
liberties.435 Further, the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance 
prescribes “application of so broad and obscure a standard,” “[it] 
threats to create serious problems.”436 With PWGS on the horizon, 
it is both critical to predict the foreseeable likelihood of state 
intervention in physician-patient conversations, and to anticipate 
the constitutional concerns triggered by such interventions.437 
V. “Context Matters”: Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing 
The practice of prenatal medicine is changing. Until the late 
1980s, women did not begin making decisions until months into 
pregnancy,438 and their decision-making was facilitated by 
multiple and unfettered exchanges of information with their 
provider.439 Today, with rapid clinical uptake of new technologies, 
the timeline for prenatal decision-making is earlier. Obtaining 
fetal information is easier.440 For both mother and child, the tests 
                                                                                                     
 433. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2012) (defending a challenge to a Texas statute for 
compelling physicians to engage in speech). 
 434. See Stuart II, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the lower 
court’s choice to apply intermediate scrutiny to a North Carolina law requiring 
certain speech of medical providers). 
 435. See id.  
 436. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388 
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 437. See sources cited supra note 9 (suggesting and discussing the eventual 
routinization of PWGS). 
 438. Amniocentesis is routinely unavailable until the second trimester. 
ACOG, Practice Bulletin No. 162, supra note 76, at e111. 
 439. See discussion supra Part II (discussing changes in prenatal genetics as 
exemplifying the rapid changes in prenatal care). 
 440. See discussion supra Part II.A–C (exploring the evolution to prenatal 
whole-genome sequencing). 
PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT 647 
are safer.441 But an evolution in medical practice has not produced 
an evolution in political thought. Far from moderating the abortion 
debate, the influx of technology has only amplified the motivation 
of conservative legislators.442 In a practical sense, of course, state 
laws like North Dakota’s are unenforceable.443 Under the Supreme 
Court’s viability standard, a woman’s right to choose is inviolable 
until at least twenty-three weeks of gestation.444 As a matter of 
federal law, a woman may choose to terminate for any reason— be 
it preference, convenience, or no reason at all.445 Certainly, she is 
entitled to terminate on the basis of a genetic abnormality, even in 
North Dakota.446 But that ABGAs are legally unenforceable says 
little about their symbolic power. Indeed, their most damaging 
effects are of two kinds: normative and precedential. 
A. Existing Hardship: The Normative Effect of ABGAs 
As they are written, ABGAs target specific action. They 
prohibit physicians only from performing abortions “with 
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking an abortion solely 
because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic 
abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”447 But the 
effect is not limited to circumscription of the specific action. The 
practical effect is a global undermining of the physician-patient 
relationship—subtle discouragement of frank and open 
communication.448 It does not take any special acuity for a 
                                                                                                     
 441. See Dennis, supra note 77, 485–86 (discussing a new method for 
collecting fetal DNA). 
 442. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing judicial challenges to various 
state statutes which sought to regulate physician speech in the abortion context). 
 443. See H.B. 1305, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2012) (outlawing 
abortions “because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic 
abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality”). 
 444. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837, 933 n.6 
(1992) (“The joint opinion agrees with Roe’s conclusion that viability occurs at 23 
or 24 weeks at the earliest.”). 
 445. See id. at 860–61 (discussing “that viability marks the earliest point at 
which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a 
legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions”). 
 446. See id. (discussing a woman’s right to an abortion pre-viability). 
 447. H.B. 1305, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2012). 
 448. See Stuart II, 774 F.3d 238, 253(4th Cir. 2014)  (determining that the 
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physician to realize that the easiest way to avoid running afoul of 
North Dakota’s dictate is to simply not ask questions.449 At an 
extreme, the legislative discouragement might manifest as a 
decision to selectively discuss testing options— or to abandon the 
genetic testing discussion altogether.450 Of course, from the 
patient’s perspective, too, the disincentive is equally clear: “if a 
medical professional can ‘turn her in’ for wanting an abortion,”451 
she has no incentive whatsoever to discuss either her available 
options or her ultimate choice.452 Writ large, the erosion of 
communication channels is sure to have damaging normative 
effects.453 ABGAs are clearly benign only insofar as they are 
ignored— that is, insofar as patients and physicians resist the 
legislative invitation to silence. But in light of physicians’ 
pre-existing discomfort with genetic conversations, and patients’ 
awareness that abortion is a charged issue, the invitation might 
prove irresistible.454 
In their historical context, ABGAs might be viewed as a 
continuation of pro-lifers’ general strategy— yet another hardship 
construction project. As in previous projects— mandatory waiting 
periods, hospital-admitting requirements, insurance restrictions, 
etc.— the legislative intent is clear. ABGAs target the pregnant 
patient. They do so indirectly, via circumscription of the 
physician’s action, but the ultimate goal is to prevent women from 
making certain choices.455 ABGAs seek to limit, however 
unenforceable, the woman’s constitutional rights. But in the 
modern context, against the nebulous backdrop of professional 
                                                                                                     
speech required of physicians was coercive of the patient). 
 449. See H.B. 1305, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2012) (regulating a 
physician’s actions when assisting patients seeking an abortion). 
 450. See id. (setting requirements for physicians assisting patients seeking 
abortions). 
 451. See Stefanija Giric, Strange Bedfellows: Anti-Abortion and Disability 
Rights Advocacy, 3 J. LAW BIOSCIS. 736, 740 (2016) (stating that such knowledge 
will disincentivize the patient from discussing the abortion decision). 
 452. See Giric, supra note 451, 739–40 (discussing how certain laws 
discourage women from discussing medical decisions with their physicians). 
 453. See id. 
 454. See id. 
 455. See id.  
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speech doctrine, ABGAs might be alternatively viewed as a 
successful first step. If North Dakota can dictate the reasons for 
which an abortion can be performed, and Texas can compel 
physicians to make statements designed to discourage 
abortion-seekers,456 it is not unimaginable that state legislatures 
might next prohibit abortion-motivating communications 
altogether. If professional speech is treated as low-value—or 
worse, is not recognized as “speech” in the legal sense of that 
word— ABGAs are anything but benign. They are the precursors 
to laws that would regulate the content of genetic testing 
discussions. 
B. Imagining Future Hardship: The Precedential Effect of ABGAs 
It is not difficult to predict what future laws might look like. 
Conceivably, they might be drafted as compelled speech provisions 
resembling the speech-and-display laws passed in Texas and 
North Carolina. They might, for instance, compel physicians to tell 
patients that PWGS can be used to diagnose conditions X, Y, and 
Z. Without a scientific understanding of genetics and sequencing 
technology, and absent a more nuanced discussion with their 
doctor, a patient might reasonably believe that the technology is 
capable of diagnosing only X, Y, and Z— when the reality is that 
these tests are capable of assessing the entire alphabet. 
Alternatively, a legislature might draft speech prohibitions 
resembling Florida’s Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act. Such a law 
might prohibit physicians from offering patients certain kinds of 
testing (e.g., testing for adult-onset, nonmedical, or aesthetic 
traits), or from otherwise communicating with patients about a 
proscribed topic (i.e., PWGS). A third possibility might be a state 
initiative resembling the SOCE bans upheld in California and New 
Jersey.457 At this extreme, future genetic testing laws might 
foreclose not only the offer of PWGS, but the ordering of genetic 
tests during pregnancy altogether. Finally, legislatures might 
adopt an approach that has already proven successful. In the 
abortion context, TRAP laws—targeted regulations of abortion 
                                                                                                     
 456. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 457. See supra Part IV.B. 
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providers—are legislative impediments intended to drive down 
abortion rates.458 For example, many states make the legal 
performance of an abortion contingent on the physical space 
providers occupy, requiring abortion facilities be equipped with 
extensive neonatal units,459 with procedure rooms of a specified 
size, or even with corridors of specified widths.460 Making the 
performance of an abortion contingent on the provider having 
hospital admitting privileges is an especially popular strategy. 
Currently, eleven states require that providers have an affiliation 
with a local hospital,461 despite the fact that post-abortion 
complications requiring hospital care occur at a rate of less than 
one percent.462 In the PWGS context, legislatures might similarly 
implement TRAP-style restrictions such that a physician’s ability 
to order PWGS for a patient that is contingent on medically 
unnecessary and functionally onerous requirements. The 
implication of any one of these potential regulatory moves, of 
course, is that it is appropriate for legislatures to narrow the 
decision-making options for any given family. More broadly, the 
implication is that politicians, rather than medical professionals, 
are best qualified to answer medical questions. The unavoidable 
result if any of these laws were passed would be an unequivocal 
loss of patients’ decision-making power and physicians’ freedom of 
speech. 
                                                                                                     
 458. See sources cited supra note 37 (examining TRAP laws). 
 459. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-3 (LexisNexis 2018) (setting 
conditions for abortions post-viability); H.B. 4146, 2015 Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2015) (proposing neonatal unit requirement).  
 460. Nine states regulate the size of abortion procedure rooms and seven 
states regulate the width of corridors in facilities where abortions are performed. 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-
providers (last updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019 (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 461. Id. 
 462. Laura Kurtzman, Major Complication Rate After Abortion Is Extremely 
Low, Study Shows, UCSF NEWS CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014), 
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2014/12/121781/major-complication-rate-after-
abortion-extremely-low-study-shows (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Predicting judicial intervention, however, is far easier than 
predicting legislative action. The law, for all its failings, is an 
iterative instrument— courts rarely approach problems, even new 
problems, with an entirely new methodology. For this reason, the 
physician speech cases recently decided in the Eleventh, Ninth, 
Fifth, Fourth, and Third Circuits likely represent the spectrum of 
possible judicial approaches with respect to future PWGS 
legislation. As it stands, given a speech-specific law and a 
responsive First Amendment challenge, the question a court will 
always answer is this: how valuable is physician speech? If the 
answer to this question is “low,” then the approaches adopted by 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are appropriate and we should expect 
courts to apply rational basis review.463 If rational basis is the 
appropriate test, we should expect legislatures to feel, rightly, 
empowered to compel, prohibit, and direct physician speech as they 
see fit. There is, however, good reason to suspect that physician 
speech is anything but low-value. 
The original doctrine underlying First Amendment protection 
is helpful scaffolding for assigning value to physician speech in 
modern medicine. An argument that physician speech is not 
low-value suggests, doctrinally, that it must therefore be either: (1) 
inherently valuable as a conduit for self-expression, or (2) 
instrumentally valuable as a tool to accomplish something else. In 
the United States, medicine is not an expressive profession— at 
least not in the way acting, creative writing, or fashion design are. 
American medicine is a professional practice rather than an 
artistic pursuit, which makes claims of inherent value 
conceptually difficult. When physicians act or speak, we do not ask 
if what they have done is beautiful. We ask if they have met the 
practice guidelines for good medicine. We ask if they have helped 
the patient. This distinction is significant. Indeed, it seems to be 
the driving rationale behind, for example, the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach to SOCE bans.464 The court’s conclusion in Pickup v. 
Brown was that California’s SB 1172 regulated medical conduct, 
not expressive speech.465 By categorizing physician speech as 
                                                                                                     
 463. See supra Part IV.C.; IV.B. 
 464. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 465. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging 
California law prohibiting “state-licensed mental health providers from engaging 
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non-expressive, as conduct within a professional practice, the court 
rejected the inherent value of physician speech as a conduit for 
self-expression.466 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey 
followed from its conclusion that medically accurate speech was 
closer to professional conduct than expressive speech and was 
therefore not entitled to heightened scrutiny.467  
But to conclude that physician speech is low-value because it 
is not inherently valuable as a conduit for self-expression ignores 
entirely the possibility that it might be instrumentally high-value 
as a tool to accomplish something else— namely, good medicine. 
Indeed, the instrumental value of physician speech seems to have 
been the focus of Eleventh Circuit Judge Wilson’s numerous 
dissents in the Wollschlaeger litigation.468 The Eleventh Circuit’s 
final opinion— that firearm inquiries would not lead to the practice 
of bad medicine— was focused entirely on instrumental value.469 
The Third Circuit, too, found that physician speech has at least 
medium-value because it serves an “informational function” for 
patients.470 And the Fourth Circuit, of course, went further than 
both the Third and Eleventh Circuits in finding that physician 
speech is both instrumentally valuable and inherently valuable as 
a “plainly expressive act.”471 
American medicine may not be an expressive profession. But 
it is absolutely an instrumentally valuable one. In the United 
States, medicine is highly regulated because we are, as a nation, 
                                                                                                     
in ‘sexual orientation change efforts’ with patients under 18 years of age”). 
 466. See id. at 1227 (evaluating the statute at issue’s implication for physician 
speech). 
 467. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 572 (5th Cir. 2012) (challenging a Texas statue for its effect on physician 
speech).  
 468. See Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2017) (addressing 
the challenge to a Florida statute regulating physician speech regarding 
firearms). 
 469. See id. at 1318 (addressing the challenge to a Florida statute regulating 
physician speech regarding firearms). 
 470. See supra notes 368–371 and accompanying text (explaining that 
professional speech, like commercial speech, serves as an important channel for 
the communication of information that might otherwise never reach the public). 
 471. See supra text accompanying notes 414–416. 
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concerned with empowering patients. If a surgeon performs an 
unnecessary surgery without the patient’s consent, it is no defense 
for the surgeon to say that her diagnosis was elegant or that her 
sutures were a work of art. We believe that safeguarding patient 
autonomy ensures the practice of “good medicine.” To that end, we 
have enshrined in law principles like informed consent and the 
right to refuse treatment.472 If we assume, as the Third, Fourth, 
and Eleventh Circuits do, that open communication between 
patients and their doctors is integral to patient autonomy—
integral, that is, to the practice of good medicine— then physician 
speech is at least medium-value.473 Indeed, insofar as it promotes 
informed decision-making, physician speech is high-value, and 
rational basis review is wholly inappropriate.474 If physician 
speech is valuable— possibly, very valuable— then intermediate 
scrutiny is the constitutional floor and strict scrutiny is the ceiling. 
VI. Conclusion 
The lower courts have repeatedly approached the problem of 
identifying professional speech by attempting to differentiate 
“medical conduct” from physician speech.475 In Becerra, the 
Supreme Court addressed the question by suggesting that 
physician speech should be considered speech under the First 
Amendment when “it is tied to a [medical] procedure.”476 By that 
definition, the majority reasoned, disclosures of the type 
challenged in Casey withstand constitutional scrutiny because 
                                                                                                     
 472. See Piechan, supra note 12 (discussing informed consent in the context 
of genetic testing). 
 473. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger V, 848 F.3d 1293, 1316 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he 
American Medical Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics each 
recommend that doctors and pediatricians routinely ask patients about firearm 
ownership, and educate them about the dangers posed to children by firearms 
that are not safely secured”). 
 474. See, e.g., id. at 1311 (“[W]e do not think it is appropriate to subject 
content-based restrictions on speech by those engaged in a certain profession to 
mere rational basis review.”). 
 475. See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(concluding California’s prohibition on sexual orientation conversion therapy for 
minors was a Constitutional regulation of professional conduct). 
 476. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 
(2018). 
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they facilitate informed consent for a medical procedure (i.e., an 
abortion).477 By contrast, the notices challenged in Becerra were 
struck down for lacking a sufficient connection to a medical 
procedure.478 But notably, the Court did not indicate how close a 
connection is needed to pass constitutional muster nor did it 
provide a framework for identifying what counts as a “connection” 
in the first place. As Justice Breyer’s dissent quickly pointed out, 
if Pennsylvania can require disclosures about adoption to get an 
abortion (as in Casey), why can’t California require disclosures 
about abortion to get prenatal or reproductive care (as in 
Becerra)?479 
It seems likely that the problem is in the question itself. 
Courts should not be asking: Is this medical conduct or “speech as 
speech”? Rather, the more appropriate question is: Does treating 
physician speech as conduct— in essence, does treating physician 
speech as low-value— lead to the practice of good medicine? Once 
that question is raised, proposing a coherent definition for 
professional speech is far easier. Physician speech is professional 
speech— not medical conduct— when treating it as such promotes 
patient safety, occurs within the confines of a doctor-patient 
relationship, and is supported by evidence-based medicine. When 
these three criteria are met, physician speech is high-value— and 
the tests designed for high-value speech apply. Of course, there 
remain definitional questions about how promotion of patient 
safety ought to be quantified, how a doctor-patient relationship 
ought to be recognized, and how much evidence (and of what type) 
demonstrates evidence-based medicine. While such questions are 
beyond the scope of this Article, the proposed definition 
nonetheless suggests the same conclusion: rational basis review is 
wholly inappropriate for professional speech— and for physician 
speech, especially. 
                                                                                                     
 477. See id. at 2373 (comparing the disclosures required in a California 
statute with similar disclosures required by a Pennsylvania statute in Casey). 
 478. See id. at 2375 (“[T]he licensed notice is not sufficiently drawn to achieve 
it”). 
 479. See id. at 2283 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
